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INTRODUCTION
Law-and-economics orthodoxy suggests that the emergence of property
rights is a story of evolutionary success.' In Harold Demsetz's classic
formulation, rising resource values lead to the creation of private property
rights when the benefits of private ownership outweigh its costs.' While this
formulation has been modified and elaborated over time, particularly in
relation to common property regimes, its proponents continue to apply a basic
cost-benefit analysis to predict the evolution of property systems toward
efficiency and net social welfare. In these terms, property is simply another
legal institution that evolves toward efficiency under the influence of
competitive conditions.3
While most of the examples supporting Demsetz's thesis have been taken
from North America and England,4 the prognosis for the rest of the world
should also be relatively optimistic.' Because rising populations and trade
opportunities increase resource values, and thus increase the benefits of
authorized ownership and use, a general transition should take place from open
1. See Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. i81, 182
(2003).
2. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.)
347 (1967).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002) ("The Demsetz thesis can be seen as an anticipation of
the idea that the common law evolves toward efficient rules."). This conception is closely
associated with the general economic theory of induced institutional innovation. See Vernon
W. Ruttan & Yujiro Hayami, Toward a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation, 20 J. DEV.
STUD. 203 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 2, at 351-52 (discussing the Montagne Indians of North
America); see also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J.
ECON. HIST. i6, 25 (1973) (discussing the enclosure movement in twelfth- and thirteenth-
century England); Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of
the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and
Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 60-66
(1986); John Umbeck, The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights, 14
EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 197 (1977).
S. For studies of the evolutionary theory of property rights in non-Western societies, see LEE J.
ALSTON ET AL., TITLES, CONFLICT, AND LAND USE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND LAND REFORM ON THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON FRONTIER 81-152 (1999); ESTER BOSERUP,
THE CONDITIONS OF AGRICULTURAL GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
UNDER POPULATION PRESSURE (1965); YUJIRO HAYAMI & MASAO KIKUCHI, ASIAN VILLAGE
ECONOMY AT THE CROSSROADS: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
(1981); and J. Mark Ramseyer, Water Law in Imperial Japan: Public Goods, Private Claims,
and Legal Convergence, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1989).
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access to legal or norm-based regimes with clear property rights and rules.
These regimes may have private or common property elements, but the result
should be the same: a move from wasteful resource consumption and
competition to a system of investment, sustainable resource consumption, and
internalization of unwanted spillover effects. Moreover, once such a beneficial
regime is established, the likelihood of reversion to open or contested access
will be relatively low because the benefits of property are continuous, and other
6institutions emerge to protect its existence.
Outside of more developed economies, this optimistic picture does not
appear to be matched by reality. Despite rapidly increasing populations and
resource values, many Third World property systems remain plagued by
widespread legal uncertainty, resource conflicts, and environmental
degradation. These phenomena may be seen in Sub-Saharan cycles of famine
and war, in the vast, informal settlements in Asian and Latin American mega-
cities, and in the alarming rates of deforestation and illegal logging in tropical
regions. Indeed, in many contexts, relatively viable resource-governance
regimes have reverted to open access notwithstanding conditions favorable to
the creation of property rights. In short, a number of contemporary cases
challenge Demsetzian optimism about the emergence and maintenance of
property rights.7
6. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 3, at S337 (summarizing the conclusions of a conference on the
evolution of property rights held at Northwestern University School of Law, April 21-22,
2001, with the observation that "[a] possible generalization... is that property rights are
sticky in the sense that large up-front costs make it hard to create them, but once created,
there is often little reason to get rid of them even if the benefits decline to the point where
they would not be created de novo"). Even Stuart Banner, a Demsetz skeptic and proponent
of public choice explanations for property transitions, has stated: "Over the long run,
transitions between property regimes do generally seem to have run in the direction of
efficiency.... [It is] quite hard to think of examples of... increase[s] in a resource's value
coinciding with the abandonment of exclusive rights ....... Stuart Banner, Transitions
Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S361 (2002).
7. See, e.g., KLAUS DEININGER, WORLD BANK, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY
REDUCTION 9 (2003) ("[T]here are many cases where the virtuous cycle of increased scarcity
of land leading to more precise definition of property rights has not materialized, but
instead conflict has arisen."); Jean-Marie Baland & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Division of the
Commons: A Partial Assessment of the New Institutional Economics of Land Rights, 8o AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 644, 647 (1998) ("[T]he range of evolutionary patterns considered remains
too narrow. In particular, the possibility of degeneration into an open-access regime owing
to lack of adaptability of the society concerned is overlooked. In this manner, the theory
makes itself unable to properly account for the oft-observed cases of chronic resource
degradation.").
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Contrary to Demsetzian formulations, property rights do not necessarily
emerge where their gains outweigh their costs,8 or as a natural consequence of
constrained cost-minimization decisions by resource participants.9 In many
cases, these forms of cost-benefit analysis only speak to the demand for
property rights. If self-help measures are unable to meet that demand, and
additional assistance is required to either enforce an exclusionary claim or
legitimize it for the purposes of bargaining, different incentives will intrude
according to the nature of the assistance needed.' ° When claimants seek
assistance through private, second-party measures-e.g., the establishment of
an informal norm-based order or a coalition of interests-the supply of
enforceable property institutions will be greatly affected by cooperation and
transaction costs, exclusionary capacity, and the degree of state support.
Conversely, when claimants seek assistance from third-party actors-usually
the state-the successful supply of property institutions will be affected by
state legitimacy, coercive capacity, and interest group capture. Further
complexity arises when claimants resort to competing state and nonstate norm-
based orders, leading to conflict between these different sources of enforcement
capacity.
Complex interactions within and between property rights systems are well
documented in colonial and postcolonial contexts." Where resource values are
rising, these interactions can result in a regime of open access rather than a
system with clear property rights and rules. Generally speaking, this type of
open access regime arises because those holding state property rights rely on
the coercive authority of state agencies, but the weakness or illegitimacy of
these agencies makes them unable to exclude local claimants. 2 For their part,
local claimants often disregard the rules and institutions of formal law, relying
instead on their own normative order or coalition of interests, particularly
when the state is weak or oppressive. Yet these enforcement mechanisms may
also be incapable of excluding others or controlling resource use by authorized
8. Demsetz, supra note 2, at 350 (setting out the cost-benefit foundations of his evolutionary
thesis).
9. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S4 5 3 , S4 63 (2002).
1o. A related emphasis on supply-side issues in the analysis of rights generally, and property
rights in particular, may be found in NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW's LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001). Komesar argues that all institutions for
enforcing rights are constrained as the number of participants and the complexity of issues
increase.
ii. See infra Parts III-IV.
12. Additionally, in some cases the state itself is fragmented by competition between agencies
and officials. See infra Section IV.B.
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users, most often because of interactions with outsiders, including the state
itself. In short, the non-emergence of property rights and the evolution of open
access are often closely connected. In Third World systems, both phenomena
fundamentally result from polynormative, multilayered, and incomplete
assertions of exclusionary property rights.
Conventional property rights theory defines open access as a situation in
which multiple privileges of use exist in relation to a resource, but in which no
one person or group has a right to exclude others or make authoritative
decisions concerning resource use. 3 Endemic land conflicts and chronic
resource degradation in parts of the Third World illustrate the failure of
Demsetzian predictions and highlight the need for a closer look at the
taxonomic category of open access. While the evolution of different property
regimes from open access has been studied extensively, scholars have paid
relatively little attention to the evolution of open access itself. Generally
speaking, it is either treated as the "initial state of the world"'4 - the primordial
soup from which property rights arise- or applied as a catch-all description for
a variety of situations in which property rights are insecure, ill-defined, or
unasserted. Indeed, most studies focus on the consequences of open access -
the tragedy of the commons" - rather than its causes."
3. See Thriinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 73, 74 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds.,
2003).
14. Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property: The Empirical Evidence, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 13, at 9o, 91.
1s. A tragedy of the commons arises when insufficient incentives exist for resource conservation
and investment in productive capacity, because no user bears all the costs and consequences
of his resource use. The result is overexploitation, premature exploitation, and
underinvestment in the long-term value of the resource. The paradigmatic reference here is
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). See also RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32-34 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the tragedy of the
commons thesis). For a more contemporary overview, see Eggertsson, supra note 13, at 77-79.
16. Most studies of open access have focused on resources that are highly mobile (e.g., fish,
bison, small birds, and beavers) or dispersed (e.g., oyster beds). Most studies have also
involved either an ex post explanation of species that are extinct or near extinction, or an
analysis of the property regime best suited to encourage exit from open access. A useful
summary and overview of these studies is provided in De Alessi, supra note 14, at 91-94. The
only study uncovered by De Alessi relating to fixed assets (i.e., land) concerns open access in
Libya. Id. at 92 (discussing Anthony Bottomley, The Effect of the Common Ownership of Land
upon Resource Allocation in Tripolitania, 39 LAND ECON. 91 (1963)). The Bottomley study,
however, focuses on consequences of open access, such as low productivity, rather than the
causes and specific nature of this particular type of open access regime. A similar focus on
the consequences of open access rather than its various types and manifestations may be
found in Eggertsson, supra note 13, at 76-81. See also P. S. DASGUPTA & G. M. HEAL,
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To understand property rights failures in contemporary Third World
circumstances, we must move beyond Demsetzian cost-benefit analysis to
taxonomic categories based on the availability and effectiveness of enforcement
mechanisms. Where exclusionary attempts are made because anticipated
benefits exceed anticipated costs, some claimants will succeed and be described
as owners. Others will fail in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. The
claimants may fail in whole or in part. They may engage in incomplete acts of
exclusion because the costs of complete exclusion are prohibitive. They may
experience deadlocked exclusion because another party has equivalent
exclusionary capacity. They may fail due to deficiencies in the enforcement
measures themselves. All of these possibilities raise different issues of
institutional supply and demand. All lead to different consequences in terms of
overconsumption or underinvestment. All involve a significant degree of social
contestation. This Essay argues that a focus on enforcement mechanisms
captures these consequences of exclusion more effectively, and thus better
explains Third World property rights failures than Demsetzian analysis.
Part I begins by outlining the basic economic theories of property rights,
particularly as asserted by Harold Demsetz and Ronald Coase. Coasean models
assume that state agencies can and will allocate property rights in an
authoritative manner.17 Demsetzian models assume that rising resource values
will induce property rights, either through private ordering or with the
assistance of the state. In both cases, property rights are primarily a mechanism
for internalizing externalities, a perfect-world solution to problems of conflict,
pollution, and resource-dissipation. Yet the flaw in this analysis, at least as
applied to Third World circumstances, is that the greater the divergence
between state law and local norms, the more likely it is that attempts to enforce
exclusionary claims will lead to open access rather than an authoritative
property rights regime.
Some versions of the Demsetzian thesis recognize that rising resource
values can result in increased enforcement costs, including the need to offset an
increased risk of incursion. Open access may result when increased
enforcement costs outweigh the marginal benefits of exclusion. Understanding
this process, however, requires more than simple cost-benefit analysis. The
availability of different exclusionary mechanisms such as laws, agreements, or
social norms can be just as influential as resource values and enforcement costs
in producing open access. Part II argues that different types of open access
ECONOMIC THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES 39-94 (1979); H. Scott Gordon, The
Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 17 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954);
Hardin, supra note 15.
17. See infra Section IA.
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regimes will evolve in response to the failure, partial failure, or fragmentation
of these exclusionary mechanisms. In other words, while a resource user may
assert an exclusionary claim when anticipated benefits exceed anticipated costs,
conditions of open access will continue if the laws, norms, and agreements that
enforce such claims become ineffective or begin to interact in an incompatible
fashion.
Part III further develops this supply-side analysis of laws, agreements, and
norms, and the way in which their interaction may create conditions of open
access. In particular, it identifies the processes by which norm-based common
property arrangements may break down under pressure from rising resource
values. This degradation may arise in two respects. A common property system
may lose its capacity to exclude outsiders, creating the potential for
intercommunal conflict. Endemic forms of farmer-herder conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa illustrate this tragic possibility. Additionally, the social norms
underpinning a common property system may degrade as community
members enter into dealings with outsiders. This degradation process is
discussed with reference to the development of informal land markets in
postcolonial societies.
Part IV considers the role of third-party property enforcement mechanisms
in property rights failures. It argues that intervention by sociopolitical
authority, typically the state, can create open access by proliferating competing
legal or norm-based systems. Legal and normative pluralism is a particularly
common phenomenon in the Third World. It is often accompanied by
institutional pluralism-a fragmentation of the state into competing agencies
and levels of government. Resource claimants tend to cluster around these
diverse sources of state power, intertwining private property claims with public
forms of authority. The resulting patterns of interaction among enforcement
agencies are far removed from the clear property rights predicted by
Demsetzian analysis. Part V concludes with a call for greater recognition of
contestation and enforcement in classifying different types of open access.
I. LAW, NORMS, AND ECONOMIC THEORIES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
The Demsetzian conception of evolving property rights begins with this
question: When a resource is plentiful, what is the need for property rights? In
relation to land, for example, abundance allows a cultivator to use a plot until
its fertility is exhausted and then move to another plot for further cultivation.
Because all other cultivators may similarly move from plot to plot without
creating significant negative effects on fellow users, the resulting regime of
open access is relatively efficient and free of social contestation. Not only is
there no need to assert ownership of any particular plot, there is also no
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1003
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
unsustainable depletion of resources or wasteful competition to secure the
resource in question. Any negative effect one cultivator's actions may have on
other cultivators is so small that the benefits of forcing that cultivator to bear
these social costs are not sufficient to justify the effort.s
According to Demsetz's 1967 article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
property rights emerge in response to changes in this cost-benefit analysis.
Rising resource values increase the benefits of capturing resource rents through
property rights to the point that they outweigh the costs of establishing and
enforcing a private property interest. ' 9 In these circumstances, a self-interested
resource claimant will assert an exclusionary right, either through physical or
technological measures, or as a result of bargaining with other claimants.
Alternatively, the claimant may assert exclusionary rights when the cost of
demarcation and enforcement falls to a sufficient degree as a result of
technological or institutional innovations." Examples of such innovations
include the development of barbed wire,2' the invention of the axe, ' and the
introduction of state-sponsored land titling and administration. 3 In either
case, the direct and proportional result is the emergence of private property
rights.
Demsetz's example involved a transition from "tribal-based collective
ownership" to "family-based private ownership" among the Montagne Indians
who inhabited large regions of modern-day Qu.bec. Prior to the arrival of
Europeans, a system of collective ownership allowed any tribal member to hunt
beaver within tribal territory. Because the demand for beaver fur was relatively
low and internal to the tribe itself, the system did not lead to over-hunting.
However, as the French began to buy furs from the Montagne, the rising value
of beaver furs eventually led to over-hunting by tribal members and a
reduction in net fur-trading income for the tribe as a whole. 4 In Demsetz's
is. See BOSERUP, supra note 5, at 79-81; DEININGER, supra note 7, at 9-1o, 86; Eggertsson, supra
note 13, at 8o-81 (discussing efficient forms of open access regimes).
19. Demsetz, supra note 2, at 350.
2o. The importance of cost reduction as an impetus for property rights formation was first
emphasized in 1975 in Anderson & Hill, supra note 4, at 164-68.
21. Id. at 172. In this article, Anderson and Hill also discussed how innovations in water law led
to positive changes in the market for water rights in the American West. Id. at 176-78.
22. Peter S. Menell & John P. Dwyer, Reunifying Property, 46 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 599, 6o5 (2002).
23. See, e.g., Lee J. Alston et al., Property Rights and the Preconditions for Markets: The Case of the
Amazon Frontier, 151 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 89 (1995); David Feeny, The Development
of Property Rights in Land: A Comparative Study, in TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEVELOPMENT 272, 286-90, 294 (Robert H. Bates ed., 1988).
24. Demsetz, supra note 2, at 351-53.
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words, "[p]rivate rights to land provided a practical way to ameliorate this
problem."2" Private property rights were especially appropriate because beaver
tend not to stray from their home territory and as such are well suited to
exploitation through private land ownership.26
A. Externalities and the Evolution of Property
It is clear enough that a resource user will assert a private property right
when the benefits of capturing resource rents outweigh the costs both of use
and the establishment of the right. What requires some explanation is
Demsetz's further formulation of this proposition: "[P]roperty rights develop
to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than
the cost of internalization." 7 Why would a self-interested user ever be content
to bear the costs that her resource use imposes on others? Would she not strive
to avoid these extra costs? It is undoubtedly a good thing that property owners
be required to bear the full costs of their resource use, particularly as this
provides incentives for resource conservation. Yet the way in which
mechanisms and incentives for internalizing externalities interact with the
nature and evolution of property rights needs to be precisely stated, if only
because it illustrates certain economic assumptions relating to the institution of
property.
Demsetz based his analysis on three forms of externalities arising from the
use of resources: (1) the positive externality of resource rents; (2) the negative
externality of wasteful competition and resource consumption in an open
access environment; and (3) the negative externality of damaging spillover
effects, such as flooding, noise, or pollution. Property rights lead to the
internalization of each of these externalities. First, a resource claimant will have
an incentive to capture rents when the benefits of the rents exceed the costs
both of using the resource and establishing the private property right. Second,
as a natural consequence of establishing this exclusionary right, the resource
claimant bears the costs of monitoring resource use and excluding outsiders. In
this way, the claimant internalizes externalities relating to wasteful resource
25. This statement is made in Demsetz's 2002 commentary on his 1967 article. Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition Between Private and Collective
Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S6 53 , S6 56 (2002).
26. In contrast, private land ownership did not develop in the Southwest and Great Plains
regions of North America, because the income-producing animals there, primarily buffalo,
tended to graze over large distances. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and
Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S4 8 9 , S499 (2002).
27. Demsetz, supra note 2, at 350.
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consumption and competition. Third, as a legal consequence of establishing
exclusionary rights, the claimant may also bear the costs of liability for
damaging spillover effects, particularly those that infringe upon the property
rights of neighboring resource users.2" This last result assumes a legal system
able to impose liability, or a market environment capable of facilitating
resource use agreements between neighboring users.
This much of Demsetz's approach was influenced by Ronald Coase's
famous 196o article, The Problem of Social Cost.2 9 Coase also argued that
property rights were important to understanding and resolving the problem of
externalities. Responding to Arthur Pigou's thesis that social costs should best
be managed by government taxation aimed at forcing a resource user to bear
the full cost of his resource use, Coase pointed out that in a world without
transaction costs, those affected by externalities would bargain with the
offending resource user so as to receive compensation or induce a change in the
resource use. 0 If the affected parties could be identified, the costs of the
external effects on each such party measured, and all other obstacles removed,
the bargaining process would leave the resource in the hands of the party who
valued it the most. By definition, this party would be the one most willing to
monitor resource use, exclude unauthorized users, and bear liability for
negative spillover effects-in short, to internalize the externalities of resource
use.
These considerations led Coase to posit that, when transaction costs were
sufficiently low, it would not matter which resource user was allocated a
property entitlement or assignment of liability. So long as the allocation was
authoritative and enforceable, market bargaining would produce the most
efficient result."1 In this perfect world, the pursuit of self-interest also would
tend to enhance net social welfare. Market bargaining, plus effective property
and liability rules, produces efficient and welfare-enhancing results by creating
incentives for sustainable resource use and minimization of unwanted spillover
effects.3 2
28. Id. at 347-48; see also Merrill, supra note 3, at S332 (elaborating further on liability for
spillover effects).
29. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (196o). As to Demsetz's reliance on
Coase's work, see Demsetz, supra note 2, at 349 & n.1.
30. See Coase, supra note 29, at 4-7, 12-23. See generally ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS
OF WELFARE (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1920) (presenting the case for government
taxation as the best response to the social costs of resource use).
31. See Coase, supra note 29, at 4-7, 12-23.
32. On this point, see UGO MATrEI, CoMFARATrvE LAW AND ECONOMICS 54-58 (1997).
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Because both Coase and Demsetz were concerned with the problem of
externalities, it is unsurprising that they viewed property law, along with
contract and tort law, as primarily a mechanism for harmonizing differences
between private and social costs.3 Coase himself was very much concerned
with the question of institutional choice-that is, how transaction costs could
determine whether government regulation, the creation of firms, or simple
forms of market contracting was the most efficient response to an economic
problem. For example, he hypothesized that market participants would choose
to operate through a firm rather than bilateral contracts when that was a more
efficient response to the risks of long-term contracting.34 He further suggested
that government regulation would be a more efficient response to externalities
when the number of resource users and the complexity of resource use made
effective bilateral contracting impossible."
It was thus a short step for Demsetz to assume, shortly after the publication
of Coase's seminal social cost analysis, that private property rights would
simply evolve in response to changed cost-benefit conditions. Just as market
participants choose to organize within a firm to minimize the costs of long-
term contracting, so too would they choose an exclusionary private property
right as the most efficient response to new economic circumstances. 36 To the
extent that the state was involved in this process -a subject that Demsetz did
not directly address - the normative implication was that it should act as a
facilitator. This has led later proponents of the Demsetzian thesis to
recommend that the state provide a menu of institutional options from which
market participants can choose, thereby reducing the transaction costs that
may prevent effective choices through agreement.37 More interventionist state
33. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, iii YALE L.J. 357, 367-70 (2001).
34. Coase, supra note 29, at 16-17; see also R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMIcA 386
(1937).
35. Coase, supra note 29, at 17.
36. Demsetz himself prefaced his discussion of property rights in terms of market transactions.
See Demsetz, supra note 2, at 347.
37. Of course, this menu of options is usually fixed (the numerus clausus principle), most likely
to avoid high information and coordination costs. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, lio
YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 773 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Interface]. But see Abraham Bell
& Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 75-76 (2005) (arguing
that, in a federal system, "the numerus clausus description of property law as limited to [a]
short menu is only partly accurate, because menus differ from state to state"). For another
useful discussion of the role of government and legal regulation in defining property rights
for the purposes of private contracting, see Gary D. Libecap, Conracting for Property Rights,
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mechanisms - including government regulation, court decisions, or
administrative rulings -are only appropriate when transaction costs are so high
as to preclude effective bargaining altogether. 
8
B. The In Rem Nature of Property: A Challenge to Economic Models
Demsetzian models assume that rising resource values will induce property
rights, either through rational private ordering or with the assistance of the
state. Coasean models assume that state agencies have the capacity and
willingness to allocate property rights in an authoritative manner, either to
allow market bargaining or as a substitute for bargaining that fails due to high
transaction costs.39  These assumptions of autonomous evolution and
authoritative allocation overlook the inherently contested nature of formation
and change in property rights systems. Economic models tend to ignore what
anthropologists have long asserted: that property rights are both a result and a
cause of resource conflicts. As such, they are not so much authoritative
entitlements chosen by market participants and guaranteed by the state as they
are processes and products of constant negotiation, contestation, and
compromise.4 Anthropologists who study property relations tend to focus on
in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 13, at 142, 155-56. For a
discussion of the importance of regulatory flexibility in allowing individual and group-based
tides, see DEININGER, supra note 7, at 51-52.
38. This issue of collectively imposed solutions has produced a voluminous literature. For a
famous example, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. lO89 (1972). For a useful
overview, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 33, at 375-83.
39. That is not to say that Coase failed to consider the choice between these institutional supply
options, particularly in terms of the respective roles of the market and government
regulation. It is simply that this choice was assessed in terms of the appropriateness of each
institutional supply option, given the transaction cost context, rather than the capacity to
provide authoritative property rights allocations in the institutional circumstances. For a
discussion, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 33, at 367-85. See also MATrEI, supra note 32, at
53-58. For Coase's own discussion of government regulation, see Coase, supra note 29, at 17-
19.
40. The possibility of endemic conflict and resource degradation through polynormative or
incomplete expressions of exclusionary rights has received little attention in the law-and-
economics literature on property rights. An exception is Louis Hotte, Conflicts over Property
Rights and Natural-Resource Exploitation at the Frontier, 66 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (2OO1), which
argues that, in some cases, when living at intermediate distances from markets and
administrative centers, instead of investing more in acts of exclusion, a rational resource
user in circumstances of contestation may engage in more intensive forms of exploitation in
order to reduce the returns on encroachment, or to obtain as much benefit as possible before
conflict potentially brings exploitation activities to an end.
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the social embeddedness of rights to property and the key role played by
interactions among laws, norms, and institutions.4 They argue that these
complex social phenomena cannot be overlooked by models purporting to
predict outcomes or generate recommendations for policy reform.42
Put in more economic terms, because Demsetz and Coase focus on property
rights as a mechanism for internalizing externalities, they overlook the
possibility that the allocation process will create its own externalities in the
form of social conflict. This has two important implications for economic
models of property rights. First, in circumstances of legal, normative, and
institutional pluralism, property rights will not necessarily emerge when
resource users calculate that the gains from internalization outweigh the costs.
In dynamic social environments, the costs of conflict may be exacerbated rather
than internalized by the distributional consequences of emergent property
rights. Second, the normative implication that Third World states should
establish secure property rights is impractical when the process of establishing
and securing those rights itself creates new forms of uncertainty and conflict.
In this case, instead of simplistic exhortations to establish secure property
rights, Third World states need detailed proposals for property rights reform
that address the issues of law and norms identified in this Essay.
Why would Demsetzian and Coasean models overlook what seems so
obvious - that the formation and allocation of property rights may create
conflict rather than legal certainty and net maximization of social welfare? Both
Coase and Demsetz were centrally concerned with rebutting neo-classical
41. See NEGOTIATING PROPERTY IN AFRICA (Kristine Juul & Christian Lund eds., 2002); see also
Camilla Toulmin et al., Introduction to THE DYNAmics OF RESOURCE TENURE IN WEST
AFRICA 1, lo (Camilla Toulmin et al. eds., 2002) ("[A]llocation of rights is not a matter of
applying a series of specific rules, but of negotiation on the basis of general principles, and
following a socially recognised procedure.... Key strategies include negotiation, challenge,
maneuvering and manipulation to defend or improve the position of a given stakeholder
and obtain or maintain a set of rights."). For an analysis of property rights and negotiation
strategies in Africa, see SARA BERRY, No CONDITION IS PERMANENT: THE SocIAL DYNAMics
OF AGRARIAN CHANGE IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRCA (1993). For a canonical discussion of the
social embeddedness of rights to property, see LEOPOLD POSvIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW:
A COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971).
42. The most cogent criticism of law-and-economics models of property rights from an
anthropological perspective may be found in Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Anthropological
Approaches to Property Law and Economics, 2 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 309 (1995). Another
important study is Sally Falk Moore's taxonomic description of semi-autonomous social
fields, which argues that legal change tends not to have a direct relationship to social change
because of the overlapping and mediating effects of semi-autonomous legal and norm-based
relationships. See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 719 (1973). A similar point is
made infra in Parts III-IV.
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economic assumptions that property rights were exogenous to market
relationships. Their work has led subsequent economists to view property
rights, along with contract and tort, as market-based mechanisms for
narrowing differences between private and social costs. Modern economists
thus define property in terms of authorized rights to use a resource, rights that
act as a necessary foundation for market bargaining. Economists do not define
property in classical legal terms, as rights that attach to a thing and are good
against the world.43 Merrill and Smith speculate that this distinctive, in rem
characteristic of property "is an idea that looms largest at a relatively early stage
in social and economic development, when a society has not yet solved the
problem of order."44 As a result, much of the law-and-economics literature has
overlooked the significance of exclusion-of enforcing rights against the
world- in analyzing the nature and function of property rights.45
This point is particularly relevant in the context of change in Third World
property systems. Of all forms of property, rights to land are most affected by a
basic in rem imperative. Land may be invaded; it must often be defended.
When it is sold, it does not move. Secondary rights-holders retain their rights
unless they consent to sale, and may assert them against other claimants
through occupation or use. These acts of contestation are all the more likely
where the transfer or transformation of a right to land has contravened local
concepts of social identity and place. In short, the problem of establishing and
enforcing property rights is closely connected to the problem of social order.
Unless social order is established, most commonly through legitimate and
capable government, the process of allocating and enforcing property rights
will tend to cause conflict because different claimants will resort to competing
legal, normative, and coalitional enforcement mechanisms.
43. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 33, at 358-59.
44. Id. at 398. This Essay builds on Merrill and Smith's important point, particularly by
analyzing the importance of exclusion and enforcement in the evolution of property rights.
However, the Essay tends to depart from their analysis in at least one sense. Merrill and
Smith concluded that "the tried-and-true method of handling potential conflicts over
resources among large numbers of claimants is to create in rem property rights -rights that
give one person (the owner) the ability to exclude all other claimants to the resource." Id. at
374. While this may be the case when authoritative allocation of property rights is possible,
further analysis of property rights and resource conflicts also needs to account for the
possibility that the process of establishing in rem rights can at times be both a cause of and
an aggravating factor in certain types of chronic conflict.
45. See Merrill & Smith, Interface, supra note 37. Michael Heller similarly has commented that
economic notions of entitlements lose sight of the distinct boundaries and characteristics of
property. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 1o8 YALE L.J. 1163, 1193-
94 (1999).
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C. Law and Norms in Third World Property Systems
At least in terms of Third World policymaking, the fact that the process of
developing, allocating, and enforcing property rights may create externalities in
the form of social conflict creates a paradox. In economic terms, an effective
system of property rights is a public good.46 Not only does it encourage
investment by property-holders, it also acts as a central element of effective
markets for capital and credit. When property information is standardized, the
system allows for effective planning that incorporates demographics, land use,
and environmental impact assessments.47 Because the benefits are so broadly
dispersed and the costs of providing a standardized property system are so
high, some form of state intervention is typically necessary to establish national
systems of land administration.48 The state provides the standard options that
market participants use to capture gains from trade. The state also establishes
the public information systems necessary to value rights and collect consents
from secondary rights-holders, and stands as the implicit guarantor and
enforcer of property rights and property contracting.
49
In most Third World societies, nonstate resource governance mechanisms
have evolved separately from, and often in contradiction to, state institutions.
These mechanisms commonly take the form of close-knit kinship networks
that predate the creation of the modern nation-state. Because these close-knit
communities tend to create norms that maximize net social welfare within the
community, their resource governance rules and cooperative processes often
provide relatively efficient means to internalize externalities." This is true in
three important respects. First, as is now well established, a common property
system based on a close-knit normative order can effectively regulate resource
use by insiders, particularly by preventing unsustainable resource depletion.51
46. See Banner, supra note 6, at S362.
47. See DEININGER, supra note 7, at 24-25, 31-32.
48. Id. at 23 ("[T]he benefits of well-defined and secure property rights and the advantages of
public provision of such rights have, over history, led virtually all economically and
politically advanced societies to establish state-managed systems for regulating land
ownership and land transfers.").
49. See Benito Arrufiada, Property Enforcement as Oryanized Consent, i9 I.L. ECON. & ORG. 401
(2003) (analyzing the role of different land administration systems in obtaining consent and
enforcing in rem property rights).
so. The iconic reference is ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
51. For the classic studies on this point, see JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE
142-44 (1988); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
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Second, by definition, a close-knit community will be better able to act
cooperatively to resist encroachment by outsiders, particularly compared to an
individual "owner" who lacks access to third-party enforcement institutions.
Finally, in terms of both governance and exclusion, effective nonstate systems
can provide these internalization functions at relatively low cost compared to
state law and legal institutions.5 2
A series of policy paradoxes follows. How does the state recognize these
decentralized mechanisms for resource governance while also providing the
authoritative and standardized menu of property rights that economic models
require for efficient resource allocation and comprehensive internalization of
externalities? How does the state allow for change within nonstate property
systems without destroying the norm-based order that underlies them? How
should the state regulate the often inevitable development of conflicts between
outsiders and nonstate property systems? When should it intervene in matters
internal to nonstate systems, especially in relation to conflict resolution and
abuses of power? In short, what is the proper relationship between law and
norms in Third World property systems? While the economic answer is
straightforward-law should support property norms when they are efficient-
the reality is greatly complicated by the degradation of norm-based property
systems and the complex interactions among legal, normative, and institutional
arrangements.
The unfortunate experience of many Third World countries in both
colonial and postcolonial times is that state law has either overridden nonstate
governance mechanisms or failed to facilitate adaptation to new circumstances
of urbanization, migration, and commodification of rights to land. In the
former case, numerous attempts to replace nonstate systems with unitary state
law have succeeded only in creating a polynormative system of official law,
semi-legal practice, and widespread illegality. This is a natural consequence of
the fact that many nonstate systems in Third World societies are kinship-
based, resistant to replacement by formal state property regimes, and quite
efficient on their own terms.5 3 Despite this resilience, new economic and
demographic circumstances have challenged these systems, particularly where
they also face state opposition. The result in some cases has been the worst-
case scenario: the partial disintegration of a viable resource governance
mechanism without the provision of effective substitutes by the state. 4
INSTITUTIONS FOR CoLLECrIvE AcrION (1990); and Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
2. See DEININGER, supra note 7, at 52-53.
53. Id.
54. See infra Section III.B.
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D. The Interaction Between Law and Norms: Land Titling
Numerous accounts of failures in Third World land-titling programs
support the conclusion that state programs can interact with social norms to
produce open access rather than secure property rights. Land-titling programs
commonly involve formalization and registration of rights to land through
systematic adjudication, surveying and (if necessary) consolidation of
boundaries. While these titling programs are useful in certain contexts -
particularly in urban and peri-urban areas- they often fail to increase certainty
and reduce conflict."5 In some cases, these program failures have resulted from
the distributional consequences of land titling itself. Long-term conflict has
resulted because poor or otherwise vulnerable land occupiers have been
dispossessed by wealthier and more powerful groups; yet the new titleholders
and state enforcement mechanisms have been unable to prevent encroachment
by the former occupiers. s6 This state of grievance and incomplete exclusion
ss. See, e.g., DEININGER, supra note 7, at 39 ("Note that many studies indicate that in Africa
formal land title had little or no impact on either investment or farm income, something
that is often mirrored by similar findings for urban areas." (citations omitted)); Arrufiada,
supra note 49, at 401-02 ("[I]ntemational aid organizations have been promoting land
administration projects in most developing and former Socialist countries. The results have
been disappointing, however, and the net benefits of such projects are being questioned.");
see also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 204 (2000) ("Technically driven
titling projects tend to degenerate into identification systems for physical stock, outdated
Domesday Books, or historical relics."). De Soto recommended titling programs based on
extralegal (or existing norm-based) arrangements and documentation, rather than top-
down formal requirements that pay little heed to existing social arrangements. For a further
discussion of flaws in land-titling programs in circumstances, of conflict between law and
norms, see Jack Knetsch & Michael Trebilcock, Land Policy and Economic Development in
Papua New Guinea 32-33 (Inst. of Nat'l Affairs, Discussion Paper No. 6, 1984). There is a
strong empirical link between increased tenure security and increased investment. At times
formal titling is the best means to increase security of tenure. The point here is simply that
imposing inconsistent formal land titles on existing norm-based structures can markedly
increase levels of conflict and uncertainty. For a further discussion of this issue in Africa, see
Kathryn Firmin-Sellers & Patrick Sellers, Expected Failures and Unexpected Successes of Land
Titling inAfrica, 27 WORLD DEv. 1115 (1999).
56. See Jean-Philippe Platteau, Land Reform and Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Controversies and Guidelines 232-42 (Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Econ. & Soc. Dev. Paper
107, 1992); Susana Lastarria-Comhiel, Impact of Privatization on Gender and Property Rights
in Africa, 2 WORLD DEV. 1317 (1997) (discussing conflicts caused by the detrimental impact
of land-titling programs on women's access to land); Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan,
Registering Customary Rights, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE IN AFRICA 207,
218-20 (Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan eds., 2000) (discussing causes of failures in
programs to register customary rights in Africa). For a discussion of institutional pluralism
and differential access see DEININGER, supra note 7, at 72-73. For a discussion of "unlawful"
occupancy in Indonesia, see Daniel Fitzpatrick, Disputes and Pluralism in Modern Indonesian
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then tends to become cyclical in environments of political instability. When a
regime changes in circumstances of historical grievance, old claims often
reassert themselves through acts of violence, land invasion, or state-sanctioned
evictions.' This phenomenon challenges the economic conception that once
property rights are established there is relatively little likelihood of reversion to
open access. "
In other cases, titling programs provoke long-term conflict due to the fluid
nature of nonstate systems of land tenure. In these systems, multiple
overlapping rights often coexist in an uneasy balance, and programs to define
and regularize these rights have caused dormant internal disputes to emerge in
the form of open conflict.59 This is an important issue that relates to the nature
of traditional norm-based orders themselves. Economic models tend to
characterize these orders as common property systems -as systems of resource
governance based on rules of authorized use and mutual agreement to exclude
outsiders. Yet customary landholding systems in the Third World are often
characterized by a series of complex layered relationships involving families,
sub-clans, clans, villages, and tribes. Each entity may have an interest in the
land, either as its manager, occupier, occasional user, defender, or as the entity
responsible for ritual and cosmological relations. Anthropological studies
indicate that such interests arise not so much from agreed rules and clear
distinctions between insiders and outsiders, but from fluid social relations that
continually adapt to underlying issues of power, myth, and legitimacy. 6° In
these circumstances, it is often difficult to define the "landholding group."
Moreover, the inherent potential for conflict in customary land relations can
crystallize when "once and for all" tide registration programs apply simplistic
Land Law, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 171 (1997) (noting that "unlawful" occupancy covers seventy to
eighty percent of the land mass according to state law, but was overlooked by the first phase
of a World Bank-funded land-titling project).
57. For an excellent example and discussion see Christian Lund, Negotiating Property Institutions:
On the Symbiosis of Property and Authority in Africa, in NEGOTIATING PROPERTY IN AFRICA,
supra note 41, at 11, 25-27.
58. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 3, at S337; see also Banner, supra note 6, at S359 , S361.
59. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 56, at 189 (discussing Indonesia); Knetsch & Trebilcock,
supra note 55, at 40 (discussing Papua New Guinea).
60. For examples from the South Pacific, see Ron Crocombe, Overview: The Pattern of Change in
Pacific Land Tenures, in LAND TENURE IN THE PACIFIC 1, 7 (Ron Crocombe ed., 1971); and R.
Gerard Ward, Changing Forms of Communal Tenure, in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON
PROPERTY IN THE PACIFIC REGION 19, 29-30 (Peter Lamour ed., 1997). For a discussion in
relation to West Africa, see Philippe Lavigne Delville, Harmonising Formal Law and
Customary Land Rights in French-Speaking West Africa, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS, POLICY
AND TENURE IN AFRICA, supra note 56, at 97, 110-11.
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legal categories of "owner" and "user" to complex and fluctuating
interrelationships. 6'
A final important cause of failure in attempts to formalize customary land
tenures is the layering of formal institutions on informal arrangements, which
has allowed disputants to engage in legal institution shopping, disabling the
process for authoritative settlement.62 Another cause may be the perennial
problem of titleholders failing to record subsequent transactions in the official
register. 63 This derivative registration problem commonly results from
continued adherence to customary norms of inheritance or land transfer, even
after the tiding system is in place.64 This is illustrated by the paradigmatic case
of Kenya, where, although individualized titling programs initially appeared to
yield productivity benefits, the titles register gradually lost value as an accurate
record of land relations due to high formal and informal registration costs and
inconsistency between state law and local inheritance and transfer practices.6"
61. For a discussion in relation to Africa, see Delville, supra note 60, at 111-12; and Toulmin &
Quan, supra note 56, at 218-19.
62. This issue of legal and normative pluralism is discussed at some length in Parts II and III
below. For a general discussion, see DEININGER, supra note 7, at 35; John W. Bruce, Learning
from Comparative Experience with Agrarian Reform, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LAND TENURE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 81 (1998); and Toulmin et al.,
supra note 41, at 13.
63. This classic symptom of legal and normative pluralism quickly robs the land-title register of
any value as an accurate record of land holdings at the local level. See DEININGER, supra note
7, at 29.
64. For discussions and examples, see PLATrEAU, supra note 56, at 48; Richard Barrows &
Michael Roth, Land Tenure and Investment in African Agriculture: Theoty and Evidence, 28 J.
MOD. APR. STUD. 265, 277-78, 289-90 (199o); and Hwo Okoth-Ogendo, Legislative
Approaches to Customary Tenure and Tenure Reform in East Africa, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS,
POLICY AND TENURE IN AFRICA, supra note 56, at 123, 128.
65. Angelique Haugerud, Land Tenure and Agrarian Change in Kenya, 59 AFRICA 61, 61 (1989)
("Nowhere has the Kenyan state had the capacity to keep the land registers up to date since
the reform, and informal channels of access to land never ceased to be important.").
Haugerud wrote: "Several studies have shown a wide gap between the land register and
actual patterns of land use and access.... Access to land is defined less by title deeds than by
relations of descent, affinity, patronage and friendship." Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
Thomas C. Pinckney & Peter K. Kimuyu, Land Tenure Reform in East Africa: Good, Bad or
Unimportant?, 3 J. AR. ECON. 1, 22-24 (1994) ("Formal changes of title are lengthy and
expensive .... Title holding therefore does not necessarily imply ownership, and a
significant number of titles are held by persons not owning the land.... Thus land tiding in
Kenya has in many ways caused more problems than it resolved. One response of local
communities to these problems has been to ignore the titles, and revert to the indigenous
system of land tenure." (citations omitted)). For similar conclusions, see Simon Coldham,
The Effect of Registration of Title upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya, 22 J. AIR. L. 91 (1978).
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As a result, it appears that any economic benefits attributable to land titling
were not sustained over time.66
II. THE COSTS OF PROPERTY IN COMPLEX SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTS
Failures in Third World land-titling programs underscore the basic point
that, in circumstances of rising resource values, the interaction between state
institutions and local norms fundamentally affects the nature of Third World
property transitions. This Part explores whether this interaction between state
institutions and local norms may be captured by Demsetzian analyses that
expand on the costs of enforcing and establishing property rights. Can
Demsetzian explanations be maintained in the face of property failures in the
Third World, through an expanded cost-focused approach, or is there a need
for further analysis based on the interaction of different mechanisms for
enforcing rights in complex social environments? This Part concludes that a
cost-focused approach can help to explain why property rights may not emerge
despite favorable conditions, but cannot adequately explain the range of
circumstances in which open or contested access may develop.
A. Cost-Based Explanations for Failures in Property Rights Transitions
In circumstances of relative resource abundance there is little need for
property rights. When resources are abundant, an influx of newcomers does
not reduce the income or benefit levels of existing users. No gains can be made
from transfer to more productive users, as these users can simply find their
own area for exploitation.
As land becomes scarce, however, population pressure in an open access
regime tends to cause overuse of fertile soils. Users lack incentives to either
limit their take or expend efforts to improve fertility. These users also tend to
engage in unproductive competition over resources, particularly by diverting
See also DEININGER, supra note 7, at 33 (citing sources); Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 64, at
125.
66. Pinckney & Kimuyu, supra note 65, at 2 ("Recent surveys and cross-sectional studies from
Africa... have found little or no impact of titling on investment."). Pinckney and Kimuyu
found that there is no significant difference in terms of credit, investment, or productivity
between Kenya and Tanzania, a country that continued to recognize many forms of
customary tenure. Id. at 25-26. A further study found that the greatest gains in cash crop
income after individualized land tide commenced in Kenya occurred in the district that had
made the least progress in land titling and consolidation. See William J. Barber, Land Reform
and Economic Change Among African Farmers in Kenya, 19 ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE
6, 17-18 (1970).
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resources from productive investment to the defense of particular plots. 6,
Further population growth exacerbates these problems and reduces the income
and benefit levels of existing users. This latter trend is critical because it
provides existing users with an incentive to band together and exclude
newcomers.68 For these reasons, the shared desire to exclude, in combination
with rising resource values, becomes a significant factor in initial attempts to
fashion property rights in open access regimes.
Rising resource values in circumstances of scarcity and open access
generate demand for property rights, particularly as a means of excluding
outsiders and minimizing their impact on resource and income levels. Despite
this increased demand, property rights will not emerge in some cases because
the costs of establishing and enforcing those rights remain prohibitive. These
prohibitive costs may arise from the nature of the resource itself. For example,
in cases of high mobility resources, such as fish or bison, the practical
difficulties of excluding outsiders may make exclusionary strategies not worth
the effort. 69 Alternatively, the nature, number, and heterogeneity of resource
claimants may make it unproductive or infeasible to agree on use rights and
exclusionary responsibilities. 70 In these circumstances, property rights will not
necessarily evolve from exclusionary efforts or cost-minimizing agreements
among resource participants. In economic terms, the only mechanism for
establishing property rights that remains is regulatory intervention.7 '
In all cases, high startup costs may cause property rights failure. These
startup costs include the cost of measuring, demarcating, and valuing initial
rights; the cost of allocating rights in a way that does not provoke
counterproductive social conflict; and the cost of resolving any such conflict
through effective dispute resolution mechanisms.7 2 Overcoming these costs
67. See DEININGER, supra note 7, at 34, 48; see also infra Section II.D. On premature, nonoptimal
innovations induced by resource competition, see Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of
Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 352-54 (1968).
68. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 4, at 167, 172, 175, 177-78.
69. For an empirical study relating to bison, see Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation
of the American Bison, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S6o9 (2002). On whales, see De Alessi, supra note
14, at 92-93.
70. See Libecap, supra note 37, at 146-50.
71. For a discussion of the circumstances that call for regulatory intervention, see id. For a
discussion of the use of force, see David D. Haddock, Force, Threat, Negotiation: The Private
Enforcement of Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note
13, at 168.
72. As such, startup costs involve a combination of capital expenditures and political
constraints. For a discussion of capital startup costs relating to property, see David D.
Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S545,
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tends to require the involvement of collective mechanisms or sociopolitical
authority, with the latter being favored once property rights are administered
and transacted beyond the bounds of a close-knit community. Clear
boundaries, accurate land records, and capable legal and enforcement
institutions are high-cost public goods that normally would not be developed
by self-interested private parties. Should collective mechanisms or institutional
infrastructure be incapable of bearing these startup costs, the natural
consequence is that property rights may not emerge, despite the presence of
rising resource values. In these circumstances, it is the cost-bearing capacity of
the institutional environment, rather than the presence of high costs in
themselves, that will be the proximate cause of a property rights failure.
B. Rising Resource Values and the Increased Risk of Incursion
Costs that arise from the initial establishment of rights or the nature of the
resource and its users may prevent the emergence of property rights. That
much is consistent with Demsetzian analysis. Another potentially relevant cost
is the increased risk of incursion that may accompany rising resource values.
Unlike other cost-based explanations for property rights failures, incursion-
risk analysis does challenge the Demsetzian thesis because rising resource
values always appear to increase the risk of encroachment.73 More people are
likely to covet a resource as its value increases, which means that property
rights will not necessarily emerge because the costs of exclusion will have
increased in proportion to increases in value.74 Put another way, if the benefits
and the costs of exclusion have increased in equal measure, then the cost-
benefit calculus may remain the same despite the presence of rising resource
values .7
Henry Smith has argued that this analysis fails to take into account the
possibility that, because increased resource values increase the benefits of
exclusion, a purported property rights holder will either (1) expend more
resources on defense; (2) transfer the resource to someone more capable of a
S561-62 (2002). For a discussion of political constraints, see PLATrEAU, supra note 56, at 233-
42; Libecap, supra note 37, at 146-50.
73. See Smith, supra note 9, at S466-67, S478-83; see also Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property
Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319, 321-29 (1989); Umbeck, supra note 4, at 200-01.
74. Most Demsetzian studies assume that the costs of establishing property rights are
disassociated from changes in the benefits. That is, the costs remain linear notwithstanding
increases in resource values. See YORAm BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
94 (2d ed. 1997); Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino's Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the
Optimal Value of an Asset, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S339, S34o (2002).
75. See Field, supra note 73.
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successful defense; (3) hire someone with sufficient "talent for violence" to
defend the resource; or (4) break the resource up into smaller, more defensible
parcels.76 This assumes that rising resource values will not encourage a
potential encroacher to make corresponding efforts. In other words, when the
increased value of a resource is equivalent both for property claimant and
potential thief, arguments based on the increased benefits of defense tend to
support only maintenance of the status quo, rather than inexorable evolution
toward more exclusionary or better-defined forms of property rights. It is only
when the marginal costs of defense do not rise in proportion to marginal
increases in incursion risk that the cost-benefit calculus will favor the
emergence of more developed property rights.
This conclusion highlights the importance of the institutional mechanisms
that determine the marginal cost of defense. Self-help defensive mechanisms
tend to lead to dissipation of resources. While violent struggles over resources
are the obvious example, even nonviolent processes of demarcating and
defending property, such as planting trees and building fences, involve
resources that could have been put to more efficient use if they were applied as
investments in the resource itself77 The imperatives of cost-minimization
encourage property claimants to seek assistance from coalitions of supporters,
or intervention by sociopolitical authority (usually the state). 78 Whether a
resource can be defended in the face of increased incursion risks will depend on
the nature and availability of coalition support and sociopolitical authority.
Where these institutional mechanisms for enforcing property rights are either
not available, or interact in an incompatible fashion, the marginal costs of
defense may outweigh the marginal benefits of increased protection against
incursion.
C. The Costs of Exclusion: Open Access in Tropical Forests
A focus on the enforcement context also illustrates the circumstances in
which increased incursion risks may not only lead to maintenance of the status
quo, but also facilitate the reversion to open access. Resource conflicts in
tropical forests illustrate this point. These forests have dramatically increased
in value as a result of increased demand for wood products and the
76. Smith, supra note 9, at S4 78.
77. See infra Section II.D.
78. See DEININGER, supra note 7, at 23 ("[T]he benefits of well-defined and secure property
rights and the advantages of public provision of such rights have, over history, led virtually
all economically and politically advanced societies to establish state-managed systems for
regulating land ownership and land transfers." (citation omitted)).
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development of mass logging techniques. In response, many Third World
states in tropical regions have granted logging licenses to commercial entities
without a great deal of consent or participation by local communities. Yet these
license-holders are often unable to exclude local community members because
the concession area is simply too large, rugged, or densely forested to allow
complete forms of exclusion, 79 and it is not commercially viable to split the
concession into smaller, more defensible parcels."o
For their part, forest-dependent communities may wish to exclude the
license-holder on the basis of their own normative conceptions of property,
and because logging has imposed significant social costs on them. They may
also value the resource so highly as to expend considerable resources on
exclusionary efforts. Nevertheless, they may (i) be unable to exclude the
license-holder because state enforcement agencies support the license-holder
and their own resources are insufficient to resist the state; or (2) hire someone
with sufficient talent for violence to provide that resistance. Because these
communities are socially and economically dependent on the forest, and
because they often lack legitimate property rights in the eyes of the state, they
are unlikely to transfer the resource to someone with sufficient exclusionary
capabilities. In these circumstances, the result of this conflict between legal and
norm-based systems is likely to be community resentment and acts of sabotage
or encroachment in the concession zone-in short, a regime of open access
based on incomplete or deadlocked acts of exclusion by resource users.
79. In this case, the nature of the resource affects the marginal costs and benefits of increased
defense. See Haddock & Kiesling, supra note 72, at S55o-51, S563-64. Douglas Allen broadly
focused on the nature of the resource in analyzing the consequences of incursion risks. Allen,
supra note 74, at S344-4 5 (drawing distinctions between the effects of increased incursion
risk on low- and high-value assets).
so. For general references to forest conflicts involving local groups and state agencies, see Peter
Dorner & William C. Thiesenhusen, Land Tenure and Deforestation: Interactions and
Environmental Implications (U.N. Research Inst. for Soc. Dev., Discussion Paper No. 34,
1992); Robert Mendelsohn, Property Rights and Tropical Deforestation, 46 OXFoRD ECON.
PAPERS 750 (1994); and Robert Repetto, Deforestation in the Tropics, Sci. AM., Apr. 199o, at
36. For more specific regional studies, see AFRICA'S VALUABLE ASSETS: A READER IN
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Peter Veit ed., 1998); CONFLICT OVER NATURAL
RESOURCES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Lim Teck Ghee & Mark J. Valencia eds.,
1990); OWEN J. LYNCH & KIRK TALBOTT, BALANCING ACTS: COMMUNiTY-BASED FOREST
MANAGEMENT AND NATIONAL LAW IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (1995); MUNICIPAL FOREST
MANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (Ly~s Ferroukhi ed., 2003); and VANDANA SHIVA, ECOLOGY
AND THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL: CONFLICTS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INDIA 74-102
(1991).
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It is also significant that forests have high social and economic value for
forest-dependent communities.S Where forest areas are fundamental sources
of ritual, livelihood, and social insurance for local groups, excluding those
groups through coercive means - either self-help or third-party in nature - may
provoke such conflict and attract such criticism that rational decisions will be
made not to attempt complete exclusion. In this case, parties asserting formal
titles may only engage in incomplete exclusionary efforts because other
claimants place such a high value on the resource that complete exclusion will
generate prohibitive costs. The resulting risk is unsustainable deforestation
because no single party internalizes the externalities of its resource use. This
risk is heightened when the license-holder senses a threat to his long-term
rights as a result of community resentment and weak or illegitimate state
intervention. The license-holder will then engage in rapid depletion of
resources to capture rents before social conflict prevents further operations."'
In short, state-sanctioned incursions provoked by rising resource values, and
counter-responses by traditional occupiers, cause relatively viable common
property regimes in many of the world's forests to degenerate over a long
period of time into an arena for chronic conflict and rapid deforestation. s
D. The Importance of Institutional Supply: First-, Second-, and Third-Party
Mechanisms for Enforcing Property Rights
This Part has analyzed a range of costs that may prevent the emergence of
property rights notwithstanding the presence of rising resource values. This
includes costs caused by an increased risk of incursion. Cost-focused
approaches may explain rational decisions to abandon exclusionary efforts or
engage solely in acts of incomplete exclusion, but they do not explain rational
decisions to assert exclusionary rights when that assertion fails due to
weaknesses or multiplicity in the enforcement environment. Cost-focused
analyses also fail to fully explain reversion to open access in circumstances in
81. This point is significant in the case of differential valuations of multi-attribute resources. An
encroacher may value a particular attribute of the asset higher than the owner, and therefore
be more willing to expend more money and effort on capturing that attribute than the
owner is willing to expend to protect it. See Allen, supra note 74, at S345-46. Allen illustrated
this point with reference to the African rhinoceros. He convincingly demonstrated how
"dehorning" has led to a sharp reduction in poaching activity, while the value to
governments-e.g., tourism, biodiversity-has remained broadly the same. Id. at S349-5o.
82. This issue of system legitimacy supplements Hotte's point that, instead of investing more
money in acts of exclusion, a rational user may engage in more rapid rates of resource
depletion in order to reduce the returns on encroachment. Hotte, supra note 40.
83. For examples of case studies on this point, see supra note 8o.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
which multiple claimants resort to different enforcement mechanisms to assert
their claims. In all cases, the institutional mechanisms for enforcing property
rights, and in particular their cost-bearing capacity, must be analyzed in order
to fully understand the circumstances in which property rights may fail to
emerge or may deteriorate into open access.
The following Parts consider these supply-side issues in greater detail.
They apply supply-side analysis to the different types, causes, and
consequences of property rights failures. In doing so, they adopt Robert
Ellickson's tripartite classification of social control mechanisms as first, second,
or third party in nature.8 , First-party mechanisms are self-help measures
involving individual acts of exclusion, either through force or agreement with
other users. Second-party measures involve the formation of coalitions to
exclude others, and, usually, the development of internal rules for resource
governance by coalition members. In this Essay, second-party measures are
assumed to arise either through agreement or the development of social norms.
Third-party measures involve intervention by external forms of sociopolitical
authority, typically the state.
This Essay primarily considers second- and third-party mechanisms for
enforcing property rights, and in particular second-party mechanisms in the
form of norm-based common property systems, because degradation in these
systems is an important cause of Third World property failures. For reasons
briefly discussed below, far less attention is paid to self-help or first-party
measures. In essence, this is because the instability of first-party property
enforcement mechanisms in multiple-user environments invariably leads to
second- or third-party forms of intervention.
A cost-benefit calculus may lead a rational resource user to assert an
exclusionary right through self-help measures. In making this calculation, the
user will take into account the opportunity cost of diverting resources from
productive investment to exclusionary efforts. She will also measure the costs
of encroachment: The higher the marginal cost of encroachment, the more
likely it is that resources will be diverted from production to defense. Once
these costs are measured, the rational user will then choose among a number of
exclusionary options. These will range from simple signposting or fencing
efforts, to attempts at moral suasion or agreement with other participants, to
acts of violence and invasion. Because exclusionary options such as
signposting, moral suasion, or basic fencing are relatively inexpensive, it would
84. ELLICKSON, supra note 50, at 127. This classification system is also applied in Anderson &
Hill, supra note 26, at S495-96. For a further discussion of self-help measures for enforcing
property rights, see Haddock, supra note 71.
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be rare for a resource user in circumstances of scarcity not to engage in any
exclusionary attempts.
It follows that the resource user may rationally engage solely in acts of
incomplete exclusion. A certain amount of encroachment is tolerated because
the marginal costs of preventing that encroachment are greater than the
marginal benefits of diverting resources to extra defense.8" Over time this may
lead to tragedy of the commons effects that change the cost-benefit calculus for
individual resource users. Until this occurs, a type of open access may develop
in which no user completely excludes others or reaches agreements on
authorized use, because all users rationally engage solely in acts of incomplete
exclusion. Multiple-user environments may thus be characterized by multiple
exclusionary efforts.
The possibility of multiple acts of exclusion is inherent in self-help models
of property rights enforcement. All else being equal, rising resource values in a
multiple-user environment may lead a number of users to calculate that the
benefits of increased exclusion outweigh the opportunity costs of diverting
resources from productive use. A vicious cycle may result in which more and
more resources are devoted to attack and defense in order to meet escalating
threats of encroachment. In the absence of (second-party) agreement between
users or (third-party) intervention by sociopolitical authorities, self-help
property enforcement mechanisms in multiple-user contexts are prone to
conflict and unsustainable dissipation of resources in resource competition.86
Thus, there is a natural tendency for resource claimants to turn to second- or
third-party mechanisms to enforce their resource claims. The following Part
considers second-party mechanisms and their relationship to property rights
failures in Third World contexts.
85. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 83 (4 th ed. 2004); Eggertsson,
supra note 13, at 81-85.
86. Haddock shows how equilibrium may be reached in a stylized model of resource conflict
between two parties. He acknowledges, however, that endemic conflict will result if multiple
uncontrolled alliances develop. Haddock, supra note 71, at 182-84. For examples of economic
accounts that focus on the issue of conflict and dissipation of resources in resource
competition, see Haddock & Kiesling, supra note 72, at S562, which states: "[W]ith
privatization a costly struggle over ownership can easily emerge, and the entire potential
rent of the property (in some cases even more!) might be dissipated through competition
over title." See also Anderson & Hill, supra note 26, at S49o, querying: "How can rights ever
be created without the rents that they convey being competed away in the property rights
production process?" The authors have answered this question by arguing that, in many
cases, entrepreneurs will emerge to encourage property rights that prevent or minimize this
resource dissipation. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights,
in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 13, at 118.
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III. ENFORCEMENT OF PROPERTY THROUGH SECOND-PARTY MEANS:
AGREEMENTS, NORMS, AND COMMON PROPERTY
ARRANGEMENTS
Harold Demsetz did not specify the mechanism for transition in his cost-
benefit model of evolving property rights. His case study of the Montagne
Indians simply provided "before and after snapshots" of transition.87 At one
stage of their history, the Montagne Indians had a common property system.
At a later stage, once demand for fur had increased, they appear to have moved
to family-based private ownership of land. Whether this process was conflicted
or consensual, the extent to which groups in Montagne society drove the
transition is absent from Demsetz's analysis.88 He implied that Montagne
society chose to adopt private land ownership as a practical response to the
externality of resource depletion, but disclaimed any position as to whether this
involved a conscious endeavor8 9
Subsequent Demsetzian analyses have focused on contracts between
resource users as the primary mechanism for property system change.90 When
transaction costs are sufficiently low, resource users will allocate property
rights through bargaining in order to maximize gains from trade and avoid
dissipation of resources through wasteful competition. The result will be
allocative efficiency: In most cases the aggregate gains from resource
exploitation through property rights will be greater than exploitation through
open access. 9' Entrepreneurs will also drive property rights transitions by
identifying distributional benefits from the process of contracting. Consensual
change will be achieved when entrepreneurs contract with resource users, or
87. Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S515, S516, S519 (2002). A number of other scholars have also made this point. See Banner,
supra note 6, at S36o-61; James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325, 337-39 (1992); Merrill, supra note 3, at S333, S336; see also Michael A.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, iii
HARV. L. REv. 621, 678 (1998) ("The puzzling question, then, is by what mechanism
resources shift from commons or anticommons form into private property. This question is
underdeveloped in the literature on the economics of property rights, except for a vague
evolutionary story."). For a critical discussion of orthodox economic narratives relating to
property transitions, see Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theoy, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. &HuMAN. 37, 37-40, 50-53 (1990).
88. Epstein, supra note 87, at S519.
89. Demsetz, supra note 2, at 350.
90. Libecap, supra note 37, at 147-50.
91. The primary exception will be in cases of highly mobile or dispersed resources. See supra
Section II.A.
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forms of sociopolitical authority, in order to gain anticipated benefits from the
allocation of property rights. 92
In some cases, contracting for property rights will fail, either due to
distributional effects such as strategic holdouts by resource users, or due to
standard transaction costs in the form of high numbers, complexity, and
heterogeneity.93 Bargaining failure in these circumstances provides another
Demsetzian explanation for the failure of property rights to emerge despite
rising resource values. This leads to the question: Can strategic holdouts and
high transaction costs fully explain property rights failures in the context of
second-party enforcement mechanisms? The following Sections analyze this
question with reference to norm-based common property systems in the Third
World. Norm-based common property systems are the typical form of second-
party property regulation in Third World systems. The analysis will conclude
that failure in holdout or high-cost circumstances cannot fully explain two
particular causes of property rights failure in Third World circumstances: the
inability of a common property system to exclude outsiders, and the
degradation of the social norms that underpin a common property system.
A. The Creation of Common Property Regimes
When does contracting for property rights lead to common property
instead of private property? This question is important because of the historical
prevalence of common property systems in many rural Third World societies.
It is also important because it illuminates the way that common property
systems can deteriorate into open access.
In a perfect world of zero transaction costs, private and common property
regimes would be equally efficient responses to the externalities created by
rising resource values. Both allow the right and ability to capture the positive
externality of resource rents, thereby encouraging authorized users to invest in
the resource. Both provide mechanisms to exclude outsiders, thereby
maintaining income levels and preventing dissipation of resources through
competition and overconsumption. Both identify users who will bear liability
for spillover effects, thereby providing disincentives for activities such as
pollution. Above all, no social conflict arises from the allocation of property
rights to particular claimants in either regime because the process of
measurement, delineation, and enforcement is frictionless. 94
92. Anderson & Hill, supra note 86, at 119-29.
93. Libecap, supra note 37, at 147-50.
94. See Baland & Platteau, supra note 7, at 644-45; Smith, supra note 9, at S468.
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Once transaction costs are introduced into the analysis, private property
appears to be a more efficient option because common property is burdened by
additional governance costs. 9 Whereas in a private property regime owners
possess direct knowledge and control over the impact of their resource use,
common property regimes require mechanisms for collective agreement,
monitoring, and enforcement. These agreements establish the rules and norms
of resource use, and the nature and use of defensive mechanisms to exclude
outsiders. The costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing these
agreements will rise with the increased size, heterogeneity, and wealth
inequality within the actual or potential group of common property holders. 96
These costs will also rise with increased resource values, particularly when
driven by population growth, because increased values tend to increase
externalities related to resource competition and overconsumption. 9
7
Given the comparatively high transaction costs required by a common
property regime, why would an open access system ever evolve into one of
common property? Such are the governance costs of common property, and
their rate of increase in response to rising resource values, that private property
would always appear to be the preferable option. In many cases, however, a
common property system emerges because the nature of the resource, its
exploitation techniques, and the need to insure against environmental risks
renders common property more efficient under the circumstances. 98 For
example, as discussed above, highly mobile or dispersed resources tend not to
be exploited through separate parcels of private property because of the high
costs of measurement, allocation, and exclusion.9 9 But they may be susceptible
9s. Private property is favored by commentators such as Demsetz because it reduces the number
of people involved in resource use decisions. One party - the owner - is delegated the task of
monitoring resource use in return for the right to capture rents. Ellickson has also suggested
that a reduction in the number of parties involved in a private property regime also
facilitates cooperation. See ELLICKSON, supra note 50, at 284-85; Robert C. Ellickson, Property
in Land, 1O2 YALE L.J. 1315, 1330-31 (1993). As noted above, however, this analysis also needs
to incorporate the significance of exclusion, in particular the fact that the process of
allocating and delegating private property ownership may be highly prone to conflict and, as
a result, may markedly increase the cost of cooperation and enforcing property rights. See
KOMESAR, supra note lo, at 127-31.
96. See Libecap, supra note 37, at 146-50.
97. See Eggertsson, supra note 13, at 79; Libecap, supra note 37, at 146-56. As resource values
rise, so too do the costs of coordinating investment efforts. Over time, this also leads to
efficiency losses. See Baland & Platteau, supra note 7, at 645.
98. There is now an abundance of literature on this point. See, e.g., Eggertsson, supra note 13, at
84-85; Ellickson, supra note 95, at 1332-44; Smith, supra note 9, at S4 68-71.
99. Baland & Platteau, supra note 7, at 645-46. In this case, there are also economies of scale in
allowing the resource to move over a large area without the parcelization of territory. See,
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to less fine-grained forms of demarcation and enforcement, as when a group
member is granted temporary use rights to a particular area or resource. In this
situation, short-term usufructuary rights may be all that is required to allow
resource users to capture rents in response to rising resource values, while the
common property regime provides low-cost governance-based proxies for
delineating and enforcing these usufructuary rights. °°
In some cases, the prevalent type of resource exploitation technique may
encourage collective forms of resource governance. Shifting cultivation,
nomadic herding, and wet-rice farming are production techniques suited to
communal control of a particular area, and the development of rules and norms
for resource use by community members. Under these production techniques,
no further parcelization of areas or allocation of exclusionary rights is necessary
because the production technique either requires a high degree of cooperative
activity, entails some shifting of areas for resource exploitation, or is optimal
under circumstances of large parcelization alone. In all these situations,
economies of scale exist in exploiting the resource through collective
governance mechanisms that internalize externalities created by community
members."'
Additionally, the ability to allocate resources to members as needed
through common property mechanisms provides a form of social insurance
when no other insurance mechanism is present.' °2 In relation to land, this
insurance can act as a safety net in the event of crop failure or the loss of off-
land employment, while mitigating the risk of loss of land when land is the
only productive asset.1 °3 For these reasons, common property systems often
prevail in circumstances of high social or environmental hazard and relative
absence of alternative insurance arrangements. 1°4 These systems will tend to
e.g., Martin J. Bailey, Approximate Optimality ofAboriginal Property Rights, 35 J.L. & ECON. 183
(1992); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).
1oo. See Smith, supra note 9, at S468-71.
lol. See DEININGER, supra note 7, at 29.
1o2. See Baland & Platteau, supra note 7, at 646; Johnsen, supra note 4, at 62-66 (discussing the
social insurance function of the potlatch system among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians);
Jeffrey B. Nugent & Nicolas Sanchez, Common Property Rights as an Endogenous Response to
Risk, 8o AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 65i (1998); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society,
with Special Reference to Law, 23 J.L. &ECON. 1, lO-19 (198o).
103. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 95, at 1336-44 (providing relevant case studies).
104. Id. at 1341-44; see also DEININGER, supra note 7, at 29.
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retain their insurance function in the face of rising resource values, at least until
superior alternative insurance mechanisms become available."' 5
These explanations aside, it also seems plausible that- historically, at
least- common property regimes developed primarily as "first pass" attempts
at excluding outsiders.1o 6 In the absence of an external sociopolitical authority
that could assist with the enforcement of property rights, a resource claimant
will tend to seek coalitions with compatible users to assist in the exclusion of
outsiders. In other words, where third-party assistance is either unavailable or
is the subject of sufficient distrust, resource claimants tend to turn to second-
party assistance in the form of agreements between compatible users.0 7 These
agreements act as an insurance mechanism against enemy attack or invasion. It
is only later, when internal population growth puts further pressure on
resources, that governance mechanisms -rules and norms relating to
authorized resource use-are required."' This is significant because the
existence of an exclusionary coalition means that some institutional
infrastructure is already in place for collective decisionmaking arrangements, in
which case it is more likely that common property rather than private property
will evolve from open access arrangements.
In the case of land, the presence of intertwined family groups reinforces
this tendency toward common property.'0 9 Communal land management
systems are rarely based on contracts between strangers. In Third World
circumstances at least, they often develop around preexisting kinship relations
that add a degree of cohesion absent in contractual arrangements."' When
land, kin, and ritual combine, the resulting norm-based order usually has
ioS. For discussions in relation to Papua New Guinea, see DEININGER, supra note 7, at 29-31; and
Robert D. Cooter, Issues in Customary Land Law (Inst. Nat'l Aff., Discussion Paper No. 39,
1989).
1o6. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 136-43 (1998); Smith, supra note 9, at S4 84 -85 .
107. See Umbeck, supra note 4, at 198-202, 218 (discussing property rights in the California gold
rush in the absence of government control or regulation).
io8. Baland & Platteau, supra note 7, at 644.
log. See Ellickson, supra note 95, at 1365-66. In addition to the nature of the resource and its
predominant exploitation techniques, more indeterminate issues of knowledge, history, and
culture also appear to play an important part in the development of resource governance
systems. See, e.g., Menell & Dwyer, supra note 22, at 604-05 (discussing the quite different
American Indian and early European settler resource governance institutions in New
England).
110. For an overview, see MAX GLUCKMAN, POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY 36-80
(1965). Deininger also reports that in Africa and Asia, "poor people in marginal areas often
derive 30 to 40 percent of their consumption from common property resources."
DEININGER, supra note 7, at 66.
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powerful and highly internalized mechanisms for social ordering.
Multigenerational family groups have a natural hierarchy that facilitates the
development of more precise rules and sanctions for resource use or exclusion.
Finally, biological imperatives for out-breeding also encourage one option for
minimizing externalities created by the presence of newcomers: bringing the
outsider in through ritualized marriage mechanisms.'
By their nature, these types of norm-based common property systems are
resilient in the face of rising resource values. In other words, while a purely
contractual coalition for resource governance and exclusion may tend toward
instability as the gains from defection increase, a norm-based system supported
by kinship structures is more likely to respond to rising resource values by
tightening its governance mechanisms or enhancing exclusionary rights
through a process of collective consensus. This explains why some Third
World land-titling programs have failed where rising resource values would
have justified the development of private property. The internal strength of
some community property regimes -reinforced by repeat interactions, social
insurance mechanisms, and internalization processes -ensures that external
imposition of a property rights order only generates uncertain circumstances of
legal and normative pluralism.
Even resilient traditional property systems have been challenged by
dramatic changes in Third World economics, politics, and demographics. As
we saw above, these changes have sometimes led to the partial disintegration of
viable nonstate resource governance mechanisms without the provision of
effective substitutes by state law or legal institutions. The following Section
explains the conditions under which this disintegration will occur by
distinguishing between exclusion and governance. '12 Part IV then considers
why this degradation in norm-based common property systems may not lead
to a transition to private property rights. These issues are considered at some
length because they are the primary causes of property rights failures in Third
World circumstances.
mii. Institutions such as bride price and dowry obligations appear to be significant in terms of
creating cooperative relations and obligations with neighboring groups. Another common
practice involves the payment of rents or dues by outsiders to origin groups. For a
theoretical anthropological discussion, see James J. Fox, Installing the 'Outsider' Inside: An
Exploration of an Austronesian Cultural Theme and its Social Significance (1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
112. In doing so, I adopt the theoretical account of exclusion and governance set out in Smith,
supra note 9, at S467-78.
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B. The Degradation of Norm-Based Orders
Most law-and-economics studies have told a positive story of the
interaction between state law and local norms. From eighteenth-century
whaling communities, to the lobster gangs of Maine, to the cattle ranchers of
Shasta County, California, the strength of local norms has been explained and
analyzed in terms of efficient substitution for state law and legal institutions."3
In Robert Ellickson's well-known formulation, close-knit communities
generally prefer their own norms to the rules of formal law because they tend
to be collectively cost-minimizing and welfare-maximizing. 114 Ellickson has
further suggested that close-knit communities may mix and match between
local norms and state law in sophisticated ways.' In particular, constitutional
norms within the group may allow recourse to formal law (1) when it provides
efficiencies of scale; (2) when it allows for the externalization of administrative
costs; or (3) when the dispute involves high stakes and significant social
distance between the parties. Individuals who appeal to law outside these
circumstances, and without the consent of constitutional norms, would be
sanctioned through gossip, ostracism, and moderate acts of violence."6
These propositions may hold true for close-knit communities that regulate
property entitlements in relatively static conditions of member homogeneity,
regular interaction, and information availability. In other circumstances,
however, local norm-based systems will be greatly threatened either by
antagonistic state law and encroachments by state institutions, or as migration
and increased interaction with outsiders creates pressures that are not
mitigated by those institutions. In either case, the threat will be exacerbated as
resource values rise, increasing the risk of incursion by outsiders and
strengthening demand for more exclusionary property rights for insiders. Over
time, rising values may lead to the degradation of norm-based systems and the
creation of conditions for contested access. This degradation, in combination
with legal and normative pluralism, is at the heart of most Third World cases
113. For a discussion relating to eighteenth-century whaling norms, including the "remarkable"
lack of U.S. litigation relating to whale ownership, see ELLICKSON, supra note 50, at 192-204.
For a discussion of the lobster gangs of Maine and the way in which local norms and state
law "made a mutual accommodation to each other," see ACHESON, supra note 51, at 80. For
an extensive account of cattle trespass norms in Shasta County, see ELLICKSON, supra note
50, at 115-20. For further discussion and examples, see Ellickson, supra note 95, at 1336-44.
114. See ELLICKSON, supra note 50, at 167, 283. The administrative costs of norm-based
arrangements are also likely to be cheaper than those associated with recourse to formal law.
115. Id. at 254.
116. Id. at 254-58. Ellickson described these constitutional norms as "controller-selecting norms."
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of open access.1 7 The following Subsections analyze the degradation of norms-
based common property systems in terms of inability to exclude outsiders and
deterioration in internal social norms.
i. Inability to Exclude
In terms of exclusion, a collective, norm-based regime may deteriorate
because it is unable to prevent encroachments by another group, or to reach
agreement with that group as to appropriate modes of resource use. In these
circumstances, the result is likely to be unresolved conflict and incomplete or
deadlocked acts of exclusion. This may occur when (1) the competing groups
are evenly matched, and the state is unable or unwilling to help one group
achieve complete exclusion; (2) the economic or social significance of the
resource is such that neither party will transfer it to a party that has sufficient
exclusionary capacity; and (3) the competing groups' production systems are
incompatible, the stakes are high, and the numbers of resource users are
sufficiently large to prevent agreement on authorized modes of resource use.
These conditions create the potential for endemic intercommunity conflict.
In many parts of the Third World-most notably Sub-Saharan Africa-
resource conflicts between different ethnic and territorial groups have increased
substantially as a result of overpopulation, environmental degradation, and
increased immigration of refugees from conflict or failed states."' The most
tragic illustration is provided by the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Although
most studies have focused on its ethnic dimension, this horrific event also had
its roots in overpopulation and acute competition for land."9 Over time, these
pressures led to environmental degradation, fragmentation of land holdings,
increased landlessness and lawlessness, and the erosion of traditional common
property mechanisms through, among other factors, the growth of informal
117. See, e.g., PLATTAU, supra note 56, at 121. ("[I]t cannot be denied that nowadays 'tragedies of
the commons' multiply... in many African countries. Moreover, it is a fact that population
growth and the increasing commercialization of agriculture, fisheries and forestry have been
... at the root of this rapid emergence of open access situations. What must be stressed,
however, is that the impact of these two factors ... is being mediated through the erosion of
traditional authority systems and the dissolution of old cooperative ties.")
lS. See id. at 121-22 (linking increasing populations and environmental degradation to Sub-
Saharan resource conflicts).
119. Catherine Andr6 & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Land Relations Under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda
Caught in the Malthusian Trap, 34 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1998). Through the use of
surveys and interviews, Andr6 and Platteau established empirical links between land issues
and the genocidal violence, particularly in terms of the overrepresentation of landholders in
the enormous numbers killed by extremist Hutus. Id. at 39.
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land markets. Tragically, these circumstances are not unique to Rwanda. The
lesson seems to be that, far from leading to the creation of property rights,
rapidly rising resource values in circumstances of ethnic division, institutional
degradation, and political opportunism often lead to endemic cycles of tragic
intercommunal violence.
1 20
Further examples of intercommunal conflict are provided by farmer-herder
relations in many parts of Africa. These examples are particularly apt as
farmer-herder relations provide iconic case-studies in the law-and-economics
literature. Both Coase and Ellickson, in particular, have demonstrated the way
that farmers and herders may respond efficiently to the crop losses caused by
straying capital, either through agreement (Coase) or the development of social
norms (Ellickson) .1 2 The value of land to a herder usually lies in its proximity
to a water point and its suitability for grazing access. A farmer principally
values the fertility of land and its suitability for growing particular crops. As a
result, there are potential gains from trade and incentives to negotiate mutually
beneficial solutions rather than engage in costly conflict. Tidiane Ngaido has
identified examples of such beneficial solutions in Morocco and Niger.12 In
Morocco, herders have entered into access arrangements with farmers as a
result of drought-induced degradation of their common pastures. Farmers
either allow access to their land for grazing, or provide feed in exchange for
money or a share of the herd's production. In Niger, the opposite has occurred:
Farmers pay herders to graze on crop residues and fertilize their land with
manure. Since the droughts of the 1970s and 198os in Niger, the price for these
herder services has increased markedly in proportion to the need to improve
the soil fertility of harvested land."3
In a range of African countries, including Sudan, Ethiopia, Cameroon,
Senegal, Kenya, and Tanzania, farmer-herder relations have not been marked
by continuous agreement but by cycles of chronic conflict." 4 The potential for
conflict is ever present because population growth, environmental degradation,
12o. See THE DYNAMICS OF RESOURCE TENURE IN WEST AFRICA, supra note 41 (containing essays
offering other examples of resource conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa); see also NEGOTIATING
PROPERTY IN AFRICA, supra note 41 (containing further case studies). Most of these conflicts
are long-term in nature. Both their temporal scope and their regular escalations suggest that
they are not simply temporary mechanisms for property transitions.
121. See ELLICKSON, supra note 50; Coase, supra note 29.
12. Tidiane Ngaido, Can Pastoral Institutions Perform Without Access Options?, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS, RISK, AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 299, 312-17 (Nancy McCarthy et al.
eds., 1999).
123. Id.
124. See Karim Hussein et al., Increasing Violent Conflict Between Herders and Farmers in Africa:
Claims and Evidence, 17 DEV. POL'Y REV. 397, 412 (1999).
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and conflict-induced migration have increased competition for key resources
such as water-access points. The conflicts that have crystallized are marked by
the tendency of farmers to block stock routes or access to water, 2 ' and the
tendency of herders to cause crop damage through profiteering or feeding their
herds out of necessity.126 What distinguishes these cases from the farmer-
herder agreements identified in Morocco and Niger? First, conflicts often
emerge from overlapping, competing, and fragmented tenure systems. State
law may favor farmers, as in Sudan, but this only increases conflict in
circumstances of state oppression and ethnic division." 7 Customary processes
may lead to periodic harmony, but clear property rights do not emerge because
custom itself is inherently negotiated and contested."' Second, there is often a
lack of enforcement (norm-based or legal), creating disincentives for
authoritative property allocations because agreements and rules can be broken
with impunity. 9
2. Failure of Governance Systems
The exclusionary capacity of norm-based property systems will influence
whether acts of exclusion will be complete, incomplete, or deadlocked as
resource values rise. The risk of incomplete exclusion, and a regime of
contested access, will rise as the exclusionary capacity of a norm-based system
degrades under pressure from encroachers or antagonistic state policies. In
other situations, group governance mechanisms may degrade in the face of
rising resource values. As resource values rise, members of a common property
system have a greater incentive to capture resource rents. When the increased
value derives from investment, the investors will also demand greater rents to
reward their investment. A common property system may respond in a
consensual manner by allowing more exclusionary forms of internal property
distribution or by tightening its governance mechanisms to resolve or prevent
125. See, e.g., Ben Cousins, Tenure and Common Property Resources in Africa, in EVOLVING LAND
RIGHTS, PoLicY AND TENURE IN AFRIcA, supra note 56, at 150, 153-54, 172-73 (discussing
Sudan and Nigeria).
126. For an example of prevalent herder crop damage, see Thomas J. Bassett, Land Use Conflicts
in Pastoral Development in Northern C6te d'Ivoire, in LAND IN AFRICAN AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 131,
147 (Thomas J. Bassett & Donald E. Crummey eds., 1993).
127. See Cousins, supra note 125, at 153-54.
128. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 126, at 148-49.
129. See id. at 147 (discussing the effects of lack of enforcement in northern Cote D'Ivoire); see
also Robert Wade, The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective Action as an
Alternative to Privatisation or State Regulation, 11 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 95, 103-04 (1987)
(discussing undiscovered rule-breaking as a disincentive to collective agreements).
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disputes caused by these inflationary pressures. 3 ' Alternatively, it may
deteriorate as group members defect in order to capture the gains of asserting
increasingly exclusionary rights. As will be discussed below, the degradation of
a common property system due to member defection will not necessarily result
in a transition to private property, but may create further conflict, uncertainty,
and contested forms of resource access.
Common property regimes may provide lower-cost proxies for
demarcating and enforcing property rights than alternative private property
arrangements, particularly when they have evolved in response to the specific
nature of the resource, its production system, or relevant environmental risks.
When, in response to rising values, the costs of these proxies and their
associated governance mechanisms rise at a slower rate than the costs of
alternative arrangements, a common property system may adopt the lower-cost
option of tightening governance mechanisms rather than evolving or merging
into a system of private property."' This process could involve greater
monitoring efforts, more hierarchical structures to generate and apply
sanctions, more precise delineation of usufructuary boundaries and authorized
modes of resource use, the establishment or strengthening of internal systems
for dispute resolution, and the division of the commons into smaller, more
manageable arrangements.3
A related response is to allow more exclusionary rights through a process of
agreement or normative evolution. For example, many studies of customary
land systems confirm that strong and often heritable rights develop in response
to investment in observable improvements -e.g., building houses, planting
trees, and fencing off plots.'33 Indeed, there are often distinctions in customary
property systems between housing and agricultural land (where the investment
of effort means that rights are more likely to be vested in individuals or
household heads), and pastoral, woodland, forest, water, and maritime
resources (where communal forms of access are more likely to be the dominant
130. See Smith, supra note 9, at S48o-81.
131. For a theoretical discussion, see id. at S4 64 .
132. Some interesting examples from India and Mexico are discussed in Baland & Platteau, supra
note 7, at 646-47. Division of the commons into small arrangements seems to have taken
place in Mexico's ejido system, in which communal pastoral management often devolved
into small groups once original groups reached an excessive size. See Paul N. Wilson & Gary
D. Thompson, Common Property and Uncertainty: Compensating Coalitions by Mexico's
Pastoral Ejidatarios, 41 ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 299, 300 (1993).
133. See Keijiro Otsuka & Frank Place, Introduction to LAND TENURE AND NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF AGRARIAN COMMUNITIES IN ASIA AND AFRICA 1,
16-17 (Keijiro Otsuka & Frank Place eds., 2001); see also DEININGER, supra note 7, at 47.
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property arrangement)."' This suggests that customary land tenure systems
can develop more exclusionary forms of property distribution without
excessive conflict or degradation of norm-based mechanisms.
Demand for more exclusionary rights within a customary property system
will also be affected by the distributional consequences of change.13 By their
nature, more exclusionary rights mean that secondary rights-holders no longer
enjoy the same rights of access or reallocation. In relation to land, for example,
primary rights-holders may engage in acts of exclusion against other group
members and the group as a whole by reclaiming fallow plots, purporting to
pass property down to direct descendants, or even pledging or leasing land to
other group members. Increased resource values and contact with outsiders
will further lead to the commoditization of rights to land and attempts to sell
or lease those rights to outside interests. Increased contact with outsiders will
also allow other mechanisms for dealing with risk, through off-farm
employment, immigration, or improved technical means to diversify crops and
sources of income.1 6 In all these circumstances, those who stand to gain from
asserting exclusionary rights may well calculate that the benefits of success
outweigh the costs of normative defection and conflict with other members of
the group.'37
Whether a common property system can manage these pressures depends
on the nature of the group, its resources, and its institutional adaptability.
Absent external methods of enforcement, the maintenance of internal cohesion
in a common property system generally requires relatively minor stakes and a
group that is sufficiently small, homogenous, and egalitarian. This creates
reciprocity in power relations and low-cost information flows to encourage
cooperation and provide sanctions against defection. Because the maintenance
of cohesion also involves issues of social capital, institutionalized trust, and
internalized behavioral habits, it is difficult to predict when and where
consensual change will occur in common property systems that face rising
134. To clarify this distinction, some commentators have used the expression "collective
ownership" to describe the overarching community right of control over traditional lands,
under which individual or household rights exist in varying degrees of strength, and
"common property regime" to describe joint use and access by community members of a
common pool resource, such as forests, maritime resources, or rangelands. See, e.g., Otsuka
& Place, supra note 133, at 12. To some extent, of course, there will be an overlap between
these conceptions.
135. See Banner, supra note 6, at S368; see also Libecap, supra note 37, at 142-50.
136. DEININGER, supra note 7, at 11-14.
137. See ELLICKSON, supra note 50, at 207-29; PLATrEAU, supra note 56, at 36.
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resource values.' At least in relation to common property systems, therefore,
claims as to the predictive authority of evolutionary property rights theories
should be treated with some caution.
More credible are predictions that some norm-based common property
systems will deteriorate as rising values put increasing pressure on internal
governance mechanisms. This can occur in a number of ways. First, sanctions
like gossip and ostracism will lose efficacy as members calculate that the gains
from defection outweigh the costs of such punishment. The use of violence will
also be limited by state law and fear of reprisals and feuding.139 Second,
collective trust will most likely collapse if group leaders opportunistically
appropriate benefits that would otherwise accrue to the group as a whole. This
has been a common cause of conflict both in relation to the assertion of
individual rights to valuable land by traditional leaders,"40 and the failure to
distribute economic benefits from outside contact among group members.14'
Most importantly, the sale or transfer of rights to outsiders will undermine the
kinship, resource use, and behavioral requirements necessary to maintain
cooperative arrangements and a system of informal sanctions. 142
138. For a discussion of the formation and role of social capital issues in common property
systems, see OSTROM, supra note 51, at 183-84. See also Baland & Platteau, supra note 7, at
647 ("[Property rights theorists] tend to ove[r]look the fact that evolution, including long-
run institutional equilibria and the corresponding trajectories, is itself dependent on the
initial state of prevailing norms and values (on the initial stock of social capital).").
139. See ELLICKSON, supra note 50, at 207-29; see also Epstein, supra note 87, at S531-32
(discussing moderate acts of violence in relation to encroachments on cleared snow parking
spaces in Chicago).
140. For examples from Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, see PLArrEAU, supra note 56, at 203-04.
For examples from Ghana, see Sulemana Abudulai, Land Rights, Land-Use Dynamics & Policy
in Peri-Urban Tamale, Ghana, in THE DYNAMICS OF RESOURCE TENURE IN WEST AFRICA,
supra note 41, at 72, 79. Examples from Benin are found in Romain Martin Houkpodote,
Piloting the Rural Land-Use Plan in Benin, in THE DYNAMICS OF RESOURCE TENURE IN WEST
AFRICA, supra note 41, at 131, 134-35.
141. Perhaps the most tragic example of failure by traditional leaders to distribute economic
benefits fairly is the conflict on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, where
traditional leaders were given large royalties from a mine in the expectation that the funds
would be distributed among and for the benefit of the group. This did not occur, and
eventually younger men in the group took up arms against both the mine and their
traditional leaders. Various factions formed and the result was civil war and a violent
secessionist movement. A peace agreement was signed in 2000, but the mine has not been
reopened. See John Connell, Compensation and Conflict: The Bougainville Copper Mine, Papua
New Guinea, in MINING AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN AUSTRALASIA 55 (John Connell &
Richard Howitt eds., ig9i).
142. Needless to say, this poses a major challenge to group cohesion, because outsiders will not
necessarily possess the kinship, resource use, or behavioral requirements necessary to
maintain cooperative arrangements or a system of informal sanctions.
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This last issue - the development of land markets - has been a central factor
in the degradation of nonstate systems in many Third World societies.143 The
fact that colonial legal systems generally prohibited, or at least heavily
constrained, land markets in "native" areas has only made this process worse.
Where they were allowed, transactions in land either had to comply with
burdensome formal requirements for immatriculation or recognition, or had to
be sufficiently "traditional" to be deemed acceptable in customary "law."1"
Most land markets in colonial (and then postcolonial) jurisdictions,
particularly in rural and peri-urban areas, developed in circumstances of
dubious legality. As populations and migratory movements increased rapidly
in the twentieth century, these markets expanded dramatically without the
benefit of legal or norm-based mechanisms for obtaining consent from
secondary rights-holders or verifying titles and boundaries. As a result, many
rights-holders in rural and peri-urban areas do not hold documents of title that
clearly evidence the historical chain of ownership. All too often, this has left
them in a gray area of legal and normative uncertainty. They are unable to
access formal systems of land administration because they cannot prove title;
yet they also live without the certainties provided by nonstate norm-based
systems because these systems have not developed mechanisms to recognize
and regulate informal markets in rights to land.'
45
Many types of contemporary Third World landholdings do not fall easily
into orthodox (and relatively fixed) law-and-economics distinctions between
common property and private property, legal and norm-based rights, or
traditional and modern systems. The dynamics of postcolonial change,
including the often antagonistic interaction between law and norms, has
produced a plurality of rules, processes, and institutional structures. Very few
143. See PLATrEAU, supra note 56, at 121. For examples of state-sanctioned sales of land to
outsiders provoking civil conflict and violence, see id. at 211-16 (discussing Mauritania and
Senegal). In at least some of these cases, conflict arose as a result of violent reactions to
entrepreneur-induced changes. This provides something of a counterpoint to Anderson and
Hill's argument that property rights transitions overcome collective action problems
through entrepreneurial mechanisms. In some cases, entrepreneurial attempts will create
such a backlash that chronic conflict rather than evolutionary efficiency will result. See supra
Section III.B. For further examples from North Western Cameroon, see J.A. Mope Simo,
Customary Land Tenure Regimes in North Western Cameroon, in THE DYNAMICS OF RESOURCE
TENURE IN WEST AFRICA, supra note 41, at 37, 44-45.
144. Immatriculation refers to the process by which rights and transactions relating to land in
French colonies became subject to the provisions of French municipal law. See PATRICK
McAusLAN, BRINGING THE LAW BACK IN: ESSAYS IN LAND, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 59-75
(2003); PLATTEAU, supra note 56, at 95-1o9.
145. See DE SOTO, supra note 55, at 149-88 (providing a useful overview and discussion of this
point).
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landholders are untouched by state law and officialdom, and yet very few laws
are followed absolutely and unequivocally. In these circumstances, the courts
and other juridical institutions are often unable to provide authoritative
determinations. Property rights are formulated, defined, and reformulated
through constant negotiation and compromise, most often at the instigation of
"entrepreneurs" who cluster around centers of state power.146 While at times
this entrepreneurial activity does result in private property rights, at other
times it leads to chronic conflict and uncertainty. The following Part explores
these issues in more detail, particularly in circumstances of state incapacity and
illegitimacy.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF PROPERTY THROUGH THIRD-PARTY MEANS:
THE ROLE OF THE STATE
According to some economists, the process of norm-based common
property collapse described above inevitably leads to a system of private
property.' 47 Over time, a common property system loses control over land use
within its territory as individuals assert ever-increasing rights of exclusion,
transfer, and alienation. Yet the question remains: By what mechanism will
these new rights be enforced? Self-help attempts at exclusion may fail because
other group members retain some coalitional strength, or because high
transaction costs-including issues of livelihood and ritual significance-
prevent agreements between competing parties. Second-party measures may
also be ineffective due to the same forces that undermined the original
common property system. In most circumstances, therefore, nonconsensual
transitions from common to private property will require effective forms of
third-party enforcement. In the modern world, this generally entails
intervention by the state.
Recognizing these issues, some Demsetzian proponents argue that
increased conflict - resulting from degradations in nonstate systems - leads the
state to intervene in the form of systems for dispute resolution, demarcation of
146. Toulmin et al., supra note 41, at 11 ("[In Africa], tenure has remained embedded in social
networks despite the intervention of colonial and post-Independence governments. The
desire for state control over land and resources in the 'public interest' has not led to the
establishment of impartial and benevolent management but, on the contrary, to the upping
of the stakes at play in the battle for land. We then see a network of players forming around
the state administration, seeking preferential access and treatment, and making the land
issue increasingly politicised. ").
147. See, e.g., Hans P. Binswanger & John Mclntire, Behavioral and Material Determinants of
Production Relations in Land-abundant Tropical Agriculture, 36 ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL
CHANGE 73 (1987).
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boundaries, and registration of individualized titles.14s In this approach, the
conflict induces transition via an appropriate institutional response, and
insecurity motivates individuals to request state assistance with tiding or
dispute resolution. An oft-cited example is Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap, and
Bernardo Mueller's study of land tides in the Amazonian frontier. The study
discusses the ways in which early frontier settlers agreed on locally respected
informal property arrangements, particularly in relation to boundaries and
dispute resolution. These arrangements broke down as new settlers appeared
with different expectations and greater heterogeneity of experience, leading to
a dissipation of resources in predatory and defensive activities by all resource
claimants. This, in turn, created incentives for individual settlers to travel to
state land offices in order to obtain formal titles, and those who obtained such
titles made greater investments in their land. 149
A. Legal Pluralism and Third World States
To extrapolate a general Demsetzian proposition that private property will
develop when individuals make cost-benefit-based decisions to approach the
state for titling assistance, one needs to assume a certain degree of willingness
and capacity on the part of state agencies. Unfortunately, this assumption does
not necessarily stand up to analysis or historical experience.' In the first
instance, state agencies may be unable to resolve land conflicts and enforce
local exclusionary claims because they face their own supply-side constraints.
Extending land administration and dispute-resolution functions to the village
level is notoriously expensive and technically difficult.' Even when informal
institutions do not provide proxies for these functions at a lower cost, a Third
World state may be institutionally incapable of providing and maintaining
effective land administration and dispute resolution for long periods of time.
When informal institutions retain social influence, as they often do in kinship-
based regimes, these supply-side constraints get even worse. Those who stand
to lose from the assertion of exclusionary rights will turn to remnant norm-
based institutions for support. Conversely, those who stand to gain from
exclusionary rights will turn to state agencies, including legal institutions, to
148. See, e.g., Feeny, supra note 23, at 286-90, 294.
149. See ALSTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 98-152. To be fair, Alston, Libecap, and Mueller do
recognize the possibility that, for reasons of incapacity or self-interest, political institutions
will fail to provide secure land tides in response to demands from landholders. See id. at 17-
22.
iSo. See, e.g., PATTrrAu, supra note 56, at 152 (providing an overview of Africa).
151. DEININGER, supra note 7, at 33.
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enforce their claims. When the state lacks the money, moral authority, or
coercive capacity to override local institutions, the result will be legal and
normative pluralism."S2
Pluralist relations between law and norms are central to understanding
endemic forms of Third World land conflict.' s In theory, the presence of this
pluralism should not necessarily prevent the emergence of property rights (or
more precise property rights). Entrepreneur-induced negotiation and
competition between property systems should lead to efficient outcomes.154 In
practice, however, the Third World presents numerous examples of chronic
uncertainty, conflict, and environmental degradation arising from overlapping
tenurial and arbitral systems. These examples arise in a number of contexts,
including failed attempts at privatization, nationalization, and agricultural
development. Their common attributes appear to be the presence of relatively
high numbers of heterogeneous claimants; high stakes in terms of livelihood
security and potential resource revenues; a certain amount of state incapacity or
illegitimacy; some degradation in local norm-based systems; and a degree of
antagonism and overlap between legal and norm-based property
arrangements.
152. See id. at 30 ("In many. cases, state weakness and limited outreach and administrative
capacity of central government institutions will limit the ability of these institutions to
effectively enforce property rights. As a consequence, even where they are not sanctioned by
formal law, local institutions are bound to have a significant impact on the way in which
land ights are actually implemented."); see also Toulmin et al., supra note 41, at 3 ("[In rural
Africa] a variety of institutions has been created with differing and often overlapping
responsibilities regarding land, while traditional institutions have in many cases retained
their own legitimacy and authority.").
153. See Delville, supra note 6o, at 97 ("[In West Africa,] legal pluralism, deriving from the
colonial era causes a degree of uncertainty about land rights and leads to conflicts for which
the many different arbitration bodies (customary, administrative and judicial) are unable to
find lasting solutions."); see also PLATrEu, supra note 56, at 150 ("Conflicts over the control
of land tend to be severe and the resulting instability tends to be great when new emerging
rights of private ownership clash with, or are being superimposed on, the existing
customary land arrangements, thereby creating a deeply heterogeneous reality."); id. at 44 &
n.14 (discussing Madagascar, Togo, and Senegal); Samuel Egbe, Forest Tenure & Access to
Forest Resources in Cameroon, in THE DYNAMIcs OF RESOURCE TENURE IN WEST AFRICA, supra
note 41, at 61, 61-62; Fitzpatrick, supra note 56 (discussing Indonesia); Boureima Alpha
Gado, Arbitration & Resolving Tenure Conflict in Boboye, Niger, in THE DYNAMICS OF
RESOURCE TENURE IN WEST AFRICA, supra note 41, at 159, 169; Roch L. Mongbo, Land
Availability & the Land Tenure Regime in Rural Benin, in THE DYNAMICS OF RESOURCE
TENURE IN WEST AFRICA, supra note 41, at 98, 1o. Many of these conflicts are long-term in
nature, in most cases because they are embedded in the fundamental problem of legal and
normative pluralism.
is4. See, e.g., Anderson & Hill, supra note 86, at 119-29.
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Leaving the issue of capacity to one side, a state may also be unwilling to
resolve disputes caused by degradations in common property systems. Even
benign states may not support efficient local claims when they are contrary to
the interests of political constituencies. This is because state agencies do not
engage in direct Demsetzian cost-benefit calculations of the viability of
property rights.' 5 These agencies are more likely to pursue their own interests
by pandering to a constituency, increasing tax revenues, or implementing a
rent-seeking development agenda.', 6 When a state is captured by minority
interest groups, it may prefer insecurity and uncertainty in property rights in
order to facilitate rent-seeking. Thus, state agencies may grant rights to cronies
without necessarily incurring an obligation to compensate dispossessed
occupiers, because those occupiers either lack formal property rights or
sufficient access to judicial institutions. In circumstances of judicial weakness,
the same agencies may also provide ad hoc coercive assistance to parties willing
to bid for that assistance, without concern for legality or infringement upon
property rights.17
Platteau has provided an instructive overview of property rights insecurity
arising from state actions in Sub-Saharan Africa:
There are countries - such as Rwanda, Swaziland and the United
Republic of Tanzania-where confusion about use and possession of
land is almost total because of the "provisional" character of land laws
enacted by the state, to frequent legislative changes, to non-
implementation of stated policy or legislation, to inconsistent official
statements .... In numerous countries-such as Nigeria, Uganda,
Zaire, Kenya, Zambia and Liberia-long delays are needed until land
iss. The best discussion of this issue may be found in Fred S. McChesney, Government as Definer
of Property Rights: Tragedy Exiting the Commons?, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICT, AND LAw, supra note 13, at 227. McChesney argued that attempts by the
government to substitute for private systems of defining rights may create a "tragedy in
exiting the commons." Id. at 228. For similar reasons, Anderson and Hill suggested that the
formation of second-party coalitions by entrepreneurs is likely to lead to less dissipation of
rents than government intervention. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 26, at S512.
156. See DANIEL A. FARBER& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAwAND PUBIC CHOICE 22 (1991).
157. See, e.g., PLATTEAU, supra note 56, at 236-37 ("[P]ostcolonial African nations are being
structured by a sociopolitical order which, in many respects, obeys the logic of a
'kleptocracy'. Wealth is currently acquired or redistributed through trafficking, racketeering,
plundering, looting or favouritism, all practices which are almost always accomplished
within the purview of the political power structure... ."). For an analysis and discussion in
relation to Indonesia, see Fitzpatrick, supra note 56. See also Daniel Fitzpatrick, Beyond
Dualism: Land Acquisition and Law in Indonesia, in INDONESIA: LAW AND SOCIETY 74
(Timothy Lindsey ed., 1999).
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tides are established, a result which must be attributed to complex
procedures of bureaucratic control that tend to breed fraudulent
practices. In Liberia, Zambia and Zaire, access to land and land
transactions are subject to the approval of numerous layers of the
administration and the government before the decision is confirmed or
denied by the President himself. In other countries-such as Senegal,
Cote D'Ivoire, Lesotho, Cameroon and Zaire again-the main
insecurity lies in the power of the state to requisition lands for public
purposes, to acquire lands with a view to leasing them to agribusiness
firms, or to seize them "in order to fight speculation". There are
numerous countries-such as Malawi, Botswana, Kenya, Zaire, the
Sudan, Lesotho, and Burkina Faso-in which powers of land allocation
have been formally transferred from customary authorities to the
administration, but where earth priests, headmen and other traditional
land allocators in fact remain powerful.'
In some cases, the state itself is fragmented by resource competition
between different agencies and levels within government. Different
government groups make bids for exclusionary resource control through the
passage of regulations or the grant of licences to affiliated entities. In doing so,
they often form ad hoc alliances with private resource claimants. The costs of
passing regulations or issuing licences are often relatively low compared to the
anticipated benefits, and the courts are unable to resolve the resulting
inconsistencies due to the nature and power of those involved. Not only do
inconsistent regulations and licenses proliferate, but the underlying rules of
property creation and transfer become matters of negotiation, contestation, and
inherent ambiguity. In these circumstances, the capture of the state by elite
groups will not lead to clear property outcomes, through entrepreneurial
coalitions, but to endemic uncertainties that favor the negotiation strategies of
powerful political groups.'59
B. Incomplete or Deadlocked Exclusion: Open Access in Pluralist Contexts
The fact that states subject to minority interest group capture tend to
provoke a majoritarian civil society response may explain certain types of open
access and their effects on consumption and investment. 6 ' Endemic state-
15S. PLATTEAU, supra note 56, at 152.
isg. See Lund, supra note 57, at 22-24.
16o. For references on minoritarian behavior provoking countervailing majoritarian responses,
see KOMESAR, supra note lo, at 55-70.
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society conflict may create difficulties in enforcing property rights at the local
level, both because state agencies lack coercive capacity and because state
illegitimacy has led local claimants to form their own nonstate coalitions.'6 It
also may provoke rapid depletion of resources by state license-holders who fear
that social conflict or political change will jeopardize future operations. In this
situation, simply establishing secure and long-term property rights will not
necessarily create incentives for resource conservation. When the system that
allocates a right is unstable or illegitimate, the rights-holder will engage in
rapid resource depletion regardless of the formal duration and enforceability of
the right in question. 6, In this case, tragedy of the commons effects will arise
from the nature of property enforcement institutions rather than from the fact
of open access itself.
In Indonesia, for example, the national army has reportedly requested (or
required) a number of mining concession-holders to provide informal
payments for security assistance against disaffected local communities. As a
result, the army has been able to demand greater payments for greater
defensive efforts. The army has allegedly fomented local acts of violence and
sabotage in order to justify increases in the price of its protection. 63 According
to some reports, the killing of two U.S. civilians and one Papuan near a copper
and gold mine owned by the U.S. company Freeport in West Papua-blamed
by the army on local rebels-was a consequence of such tactics, used after
negotiations stalled over protection payments. 64 While the Freeport mine
161. The World Bank has suggested that land conflict has been a major cause of failed states in
Burundi, C6te d'Jvoire, El Salvador, Guatemala, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. DEININGER, supra
note 7, at 157-58. Landlessness has also been a key factor in chronic conflict in Colombia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Id.
16z. For further discussion of the relationship between unsustainable deforestation, state
illegitimacy, and crony capitalism in Indonesia, see William D. Sunderlin & Ida Aju Pradnja
Resosudarmo, Rates and Causes of Deforestation in Indonesia: Towards a Resolution of the
Ambiguities (Ctr. for Int'l Forestry Research, Occasional Paper No. 9, 1996).
163. See, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ASIA REPORT No. 17, ACEH: WHY MILITARY FORCE WON'T
BRING LASTING PEACE 8 & n.35 (2001) [hereinafter ICG, ACEH] (citing report of demands for
operators of the ExxonMobil/Pertamina natural gas plant in Aceh to pay $sooooo per
month for informal security assistance); see also INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ASIA REPORT No. 39,
INDONESIA: RESOURCES AND CONFLICT IN PAPUA, at i (2002) [hereinafter ICG, PAPUA]
(citing informal protection fees allegedly paid by resource companies). These widely aired
allegations tend to be denied by the army and the resource companies in question.
164. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, U.S. Links Indonesian Troops to Deaths of Two Americans, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at A3 (quoting a "senior administration official" as stating that,
"[t]here is no question there was military involvement," and "[t]here is no question it was
premeditated"). For the public U.S. position, which is almost certainly influenced by
geopolitical considerations, see Press Release, U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia,
Investigation of Timika Murders Ongoing: Correction of March 3, 2004 Wire Service
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continues to operate, incentives for rapid resource depletion and inadequate
environmental remediation will have increased due to fears by the concession-
holder that future social conflict -and its associated protection payments- will
prevent operations in the near future. In this type of case, the rent-seeking
nature of powerful state agencies can create incentives for tragedy of the
commons effects.,
6s
An alternative possibility is that third-party assistance will lead to
deadlocked acts of exclusion and conditions of underinvestment. This may be
because rent-seeking preferences by particular state agencies foment such local
conflict as to prevent certain resource operations altogether. Here, Indonesia
provides another example. In the conflict-torn province of Aceh, the
Exxonmobil/Pertamina natural gas plant at Lhokseumawe was shut down in
2oo1 as a result of rebel activity. Aceh (like West Papua) is rich in natural
resources, and most rebel grievances stem from unjust distribution of resource
revenues. Allegedly, until the recent post-tsunami peace agreement the army
had been content to continue the conflict because it allowed de jure or de facto
martial law and, consequently, access to lucrative logging and cannabis-
production industries. Maintenance of the conflict also justified an increased
official budget for internal security operations. This perverse combination of
incentives and practices - rent-seeking by the military, revenue-grabbing by
the central government, and insufficient exclusion by rebel forces -temporarily
prevented the Lhokseumawe natural gas plant from reopening, despite its
enormous revenue potential.
166
These examples illustrate the potential for enforcement analysis to give a
different perspective on well-known property rights conceptions of the
commons and anticommons. Orthodox economic formulations distinguish
Report (Mar. 4, 2004), available at http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/press~reV
timikal.htnil, which states that, "[t]he FBI has reached no conclusion regarding any party's
guilt or innocence. The investigation is ongoing and cooperation with the Indonesian
authorities is continuing." More recently, some Papuan independence activists have been
arrested by Indonesian authorities in connection with the murders.
165. The International Crisis Group provides an instructive comment, indicative of almost all
large-scale resource extraction activity in Indonesia. See ICG, PAPUA, supra note 163, at i
("Indonesian security forces have a financial interest in resource extraction in Papua,
through direct involvement in logging and other activities and protection fees paid by
resource companies. Numerous serving and retired officers, senior state officials and others
close to government are thought to have logging concessions or other business interests.").
This rent-seeking issue interacts with the possibility that the institutions available to supply
third-party enforcement assistance-the courts, the legislature, and the bureaucracy-are
unable to do so because of their own supply-side constraints. See KOMESAR, supra note io.
166. See ICG, ACEH, supra note 163, at 8-9. By definition, in this type of case contested access is a
more appropriate description than open access.
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between the absence of property rights (open access), which typically leads to
overconsumption and a tragedy of the commons, and too many property
rights, which leads to chronic underinvestment (a "tragedy of the
anticommons").167 In reality, a focus on exclusionary mechanisms suggests that
these phenomena are more similar than this doctrinal separation indicates.
Both involve resource competition in multiple-user environments. Both usually
involve exclusionary attempts by different resource participants. The difference
is simply that in a tragedy of the commons exclusionary attempts fail because
enforcement institutions are ineffective or in conflict, or because users
rationally choose to engage in incomplete acts of exclusion. In a tragedy of the
anticommons, exclusionary attempts fail because enough parties have the
exclusionary capacity to prevent effective resource use by any single party, and
there are sufficient barriers to assembly of those rights by any one party. This
leads to deadlock and underinvestment in resources. In both cases, therefore,
relatively small distinctions involving the capacity to exclude may lead to
dramatically different consequences in terms of resource consumption and
investment.
68
C. Public Choice and Property Enforcement Analysis
To what extent can public choice theory explain successes and failures in
Third World property transitions? To what extent is public choice consistent
with this Essay's taxonomic description of contested access? A number of
commentators have highlighted the importance of public choice analysis in
explaining collective mechanisms for property system change.169 Because
property transitions appear to involve costs that are too high for one individual
to bear -measuring and acquiring old rights, and allocating and enforcing new
167. See James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43
J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000); Heller, supra note 87.
168. See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 907 (2004) (discussing
unexpected overlaps and similarities between economic conceptions of the commons and
anticommons).
169. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 87, at S5i6 ("The public choice dynamic, so dominant in human
affairs, plays a far more powerful role in the definition and transformation of property rights
systems than Demsetz attributed to it."); Levmore, supra note i, at 181 (observing that for
every efficiency-based explanation "there is an alternative and skeptical view that is interest
group, or politically, driven"). For a comprehensive application of public choice theory to
property transitions, see Banner, supra note 6, at S366-71. Several scholars have tended to
explain the mechanism for property transitions in terms of contrasting public choice and
normative or Demsetzian theories. See id. at S359-61; Levmore, supra note 1, at 182-84; Saul
Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S421-31
(2002); Merrill, supra note 3, at S338.
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ones- some form of collective mechanism seems necessary both to carry these
costs and to overcome incentives to free-ride on the organizational efforts of
others. Public choice theory identifies this mechanism in coalitions that induce
or propel a property transition in order to capture a disproportionate share of
its benefits. 1
70
Public choice analysis can help explain certain types of transition in
property rights regimes,'17' but it cannot substitute for the institutional supply
and enforcement-based analysis presented in this Essay. Ultimately, an analysis
based on self-interested coalitions tends to overlook the importance of legal
and normative pluralism in the evolution and degradation of property rights
systems. It is true that a norm-based system may evolve new forms of property
rights through collective decisionmaking. A state-regulated system may also
induce transitions through oligarchic capture of the political process. Yet, in
many Third World cases, both of these collective processes are supplemented
or replaced by complex interactions between overlapping social systems. When
these interactions involve degraded norm-based systems and illegitimate or
fragmented legal orders, the result is often fluid and highly contested property
regimes that owe less to atomized coalitions and more to confluence and
conflict between semi-autonomous systems.
CONCLUSION
The basic economic models of property rights presented by Coase and
Demsetz fail to incorporate complex issues of institutional supply. Coase
assumes authoritative allocation of property rights in order to either facilitate
market bargaining, or substitute for it in circumstances of high transaction
costs. Demsetz assumes autonomous evolution of property rights under
pressure from rising resource values. These models overlook the fact that far
more so than rights in contract and tort, property rights are embedded in
complex social systems. The enforcement of property rights depends on the
nature and strength of social order. Property enforcement is more than a
170. These coalitions usually have an oligarchic character. See Banner, supra note 6, at S368.
171. Leading exponents of public choice explanations for property transitions tend-as do their
Demsetzian counterparts-to be optimistic. See, e.g., id. at S368-69; Levmore, supra note i,
at 184 ("There are evolutionary pressures that prevent the interest group story from straying
too far from the optimistic, efficiency-oriented one. Long-run survival is inconsistent with
unfettered rent seeking and redistribution toward well-positioned interest groups, because
in the long run, members of interest groups will be better off if the economy as a whole is
more successful."). For a more skeptical view, see Epstein, supra note 87, at S543-44, which
states: "Demsetz's basic efficiency story is tempered with a healthy dose of public choice
theory."
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question of law, or institutional choices between agreements, court decisions,
and state regulation. Well before the creation of modern nation-states, social
norms developed to maintain order in multiple-user environments. The
degradation of these norms, often in circumstances of state antagonism and
illegitimacy, is at the heart of modern property rights failures in the Third
World.
These failures illustrate the doctrinal shortcomings of economic
assumptions relating to the formation and evolution of property. The problem
of insecure, overlapping, and unenforced property rights is not handled well in
law-and-economics models. Most economists categorize these property failures
in terms of open access, and neglect to analyze the different types, causes, and
consequences of open access regimes. As a result, repeated exhortations for
Third World states to establish secure property rights, most commonly
through individualized land-titling programs, fail to provide practical policy
solutions to well-documented interactions between legal, normative, and
coalitional enforcement arrangements. Economic models need far greater
doctrinal clarity with regards to open access. Cost-focused models may help to
explain rational decisions not to assert property rights or failures to reach
agreement relating to property rights, but they do not explain failures on the
supply-side that result from polynormative, multilayered, and incomplete
assertions of exclusionary rights.
Only one type of open access regime arises in uncontested circumstances.
This is when a resource is so abundant, mobile, or dispersed that users
rationally decide not to engage in any act of exclusion at all. In all other cases of
open access, contestation is so central that these regimes would be accurately
classified as contested, rather than open, access. By emphasizing contestation
and enforcement in the evolution of property rights systems, this Essay has
identified several reasons for the persistence of contested access regimes. First,
users assert property rights through self-help measures, but these prove
insufficient in practice to exclude other users. Second, users rationally engage
in incomplete acts of exclusion alone because the costs of complete exclusion
are prohibitive. Third, users engage in deadlocked acts of exclusion because the
exclusionary capacity of each claimant is relatively equivalent. Fourth, users
attempt to reach agreement as to exclusion and authorized use, but these
agreements fail due to the nature of the resource, the presence of high
transaction costs, or strategic forms of user behavior. Fifth, users reach
agreements or develop norms as to exclusion and governance, but these
agreements or norms degrade in circumstances of rising resource values as a
result of internal conflict or external encroachment. Finally, users reach
agreements or develop norms as to exclusion and governance, but these are
overlaid by a state mechanism that is itself incomplete, illegitimate, or partly
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effective. Further development of these taxonomic distinctions is needed to
shed greater light on property rights theory and its often problematic
application to Third World resource conflicts.
1048 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:9 96 20o6
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
